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ABSTRACT
The analysis of sensitive personal information is a problem with which compa-
nies and governments struggle daily. Different statistical measures have been re-
searched and adopted to help deal with the issues of leakage of personally identi-
fiable information. However, more often, legislative measures are adopted, confi-
dentiality agreements signed and data exported to analysts. The statistical studies
are performed on sensitive information instead of using a provably secure method.
Secure multi-party computation is a means for sharing and working with data
in a privacy-preserving manner where the values are protected even from the data
analyst. These cryptographic protocols have been researched and developed since
circuit garbling was introduced by Yao, and several practical applications have
also emerged. Cryptographers have designed and implemented Boolean and inte-
ger arithmetic for various applications including statistics. However, these inde-
pendent functions use different underlying protocols and are often very limited in
scope.
In this dissertation, we design and implement a protocol suite for conducting
statistical studies in the privacy-preserving setting using the secure multi-party
computation platform SHAREMIND as the underlying framework. The designed
algorithms, however, are not platform-specific and can be implemented also for
other secure computation platforms that support privacy-preserving integer and
floating-point arithmetic, sorting, shuffling and table join.
We start by looking at an example statistical application, namely, genome-
wide association studies in the privacy-preserving setting. We implement four
most frequently used statistical tests for this purpose using integer arithmetic pro-
vided by SHAREMIND. We then determine that, for more complicated statistical
functions, we need the availability of floating-point arithmetic. However, we show
the feasibility of privacy-preserving statistical studies on databases with millions
of values.
We go on to design and implement secure floating-point numbers, addition,
multiplication, and comparison for the SHAREMIND platform. We also design
and implement several privacy-preserving elementary functions, namely inverse,
square root, sine, natural logarithm, exponentiation of e and the error function.
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Using the created arithmetic, we are able to design and implement the most
often used statistical analysis operations for the privacy-preserving setting and put
them together in an R-like analysis tool that we call RMIND. This tool is meant
to help statistical analysts carry out studies without requiring them to understand
too much about the underlying cryptography. We implement descriptive statisti-
cal methods, such as the five-number summary and histograms; simple statistical
measures, like mean and standard deviation; statistical tests, like Student’s t-test
and the χ2 test; and linear regression.
The final part of the dissertation describes how we use the created RMIND
tool in practice, conducting a large-scale privacy-preserving statistical study on
real-world data. We describe the issues of performing such a study in practice
using secure multi-party computation, talk about the pitfalls and shortcomings of
working with real data, detail the extract, transform, load process, and describe
how RMIND will be used in the study.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Sensitive data
Data are collected in most areas of life. In a modern society, from the moment a
person is born, a digital record is made and from there on, different sets of data
are gathered and stored about different aspects of life. Whether one is swiping
a customer loyalty card in a store, going to the doctor, doing taxes or even sim-
ply moving around with a mobile phone in one’s pocket, sensitive data are being
gathered and stored in some database.
Sometimes we give our permission for this kind of surveillance for some ben-
efit, like using a customer loyalty card for a discount, other times we are left with
a choice that is difficult in our society, like not being able to make phone calls.
However, often, we are required by law to give up our sensitive information like
health, income, and education data.
Once the data have been gathered, though, their controller is motivated to
use them in statistical analyses or data mining to get new information, discover
patterns or help make financial and governing decisions. In many countries, strong
privacy laws govern the processing of sensitive personal information. These laws
usually allow the employees of the organisation controlling the data to process the
records only after proper confidentiality agreements have been signed. However,
data sharing with other organisations is heavily restricted. This is good from the
point of view of the data donors, but makes cross-database analyses a difficult
process for even two closely related organisations, e.g., government institutions.
The various agencies of a modern government host hundreds of databases.
They offer researchers the possibility to apply for access. For some databases, like
the education information system in Estonia, authorisation can be easier to obtain
than for financial databases. However, getting access to education information can
also be a long-winded and tedious process even if the request for analysis comes
from a government agency source.
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So what is it exactly that the laws are trying to protect? Surely, knowing
a general aggregation result cannot harm any individuals present in the dataset.
In fact, the laws are not trying to hide the aggregation results but to keep the
people working with the data from finding out sensitive information about a single
subject. Often, even the widely-used pseudonymisation techniques, that replace
identifiers with codes, fail to hide the individuals with more unique traits. A
person can be indirectly identified by taking a set of attributes that make them
unique, e.g., age, gender, nationality, education level, year of graduation, name
of school. Even though this can be considered difficult for records of students
graduating from their Bachelor’s studies as they are mostly of the same age, it
becomes fairly easy when looking at students graduating from their PhD studies.
1.2 Claims of this work
Secure multi-party computation is a way of performing computations without see-
ing the data that are being worked on. Combining this cryptographic technology
with the statistical analysis problem is a logical step forward. By now, secure
multi-party computation has been used in practice for several real-life applica-
tions. The earlier concerns of slow running time are being worked on constantly
and more feasible benchmark results keep appearing.
This dissertation describes the author’s work on privacy-preserving statistical
analysis using secure multi-party computation. We claim that it is possible and
feasible to use general statistical functions that are not problem-specific to perform
statistical analyses and make the process similar to the existing procedures. To
be more specific, we make three claims. First, we claim that secure multi-party
computation can be employed to design and implement the most commonly used
statistical analysis algorithms, without knowing the problem or setting in which
the analysis will be performed. Second, we claim that these algorithms can be
incorporated into a statistics suite, that is similar to existing statistics packages, is
approachable to the analyst and does not require the analyst to have a thorough
understanding of SMC techniques and computation protocols. Third, we claim
that these analyses are feasible enough to be used in practice even with large
datasets.
We start our research with a proof-of-concept by implementing the privacy-
preserving version of genome-wide association studies. We find that what is lack-
ing from a comprehensive solution is the availability of secure floating-point arith-
metic. We design and implement this in order to securely compute elementary
functions like inverse and square root. Finally, we choose the most commonly
used statistical analysis methods and go on to design and implement these in the
privacy-preserving setting as a general tool. We provide benchmark results for
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all of the designed and implemented algorithms and validate our results in a real-
world statistical study.
1.3 Dissertation outline and contributions of the author
The author has designed all of, and implemented some of the privacy-preserving
versions of the statistical analysis methods discussed in this dissertation. This
work was done using the SECREC language [11] for the SHAREMIND secure
multi-party computation platform [6]. In addition, the author implemented se-
cure floating-point arithmetic for the SHAREMIND system based on algorithms
designed in collaboration with Jan Willemson. In the following, we introduce the
dissertation chapter by chapter.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the terms and principles of secure multi-party
computation that are needed as a basis for the work in this dissertation. We also
give a survey of previous work in the field of privacy-preserving statistical analysis
and briefly describe the secure multi-party computation system SHAREMIND that
the implementations and performance results presented in the papers are based on.
Chapter 3 introduces our first contribution to the world of privacy-preserving sta-
tistical analysis. Namely, we designed and implemented four methods for finding
trends in genotype and phenotype data. We deployed the methods on sample data
and found the performance results almost feasible.
The chapter refers to the following paper included in this dissertation.
• Kamm, L., Bogdanov, D., Laur, S., Vilo, J.: A new way to protect privacy
in large-scale genome-wide association studies. Bioinformatics 29(7), 886–
893 (2013).
This paper [48] contains the application scenarios of secure multi-party
computation in large-scale genome-wide association studies. It describes
the specifics of adapting existing statistical analysis methods for use on
secret-shared integer data. The performance results are also included in the
paper. The author’s contributions include the adaptation and implementa-
tion of the statistical tests, design of optimised algorithms that make use of
the optimisation features of secure multi-party computation, and proposal
of application models. The author also conducted benchmarking experi-
ments and analysed performance results. The author of this dissertation is
the first author of the paper.
Chapter 4 describes our work on the shortcomings that we found in the SHARE-
MIND system when we were implementing the secure genome-wide association
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study methods, namely the lack of support for floating-point arithmetic and ele-
mentary functions. We test the design and implementation of the new arithmetic
in satellite collision prediction analysis.
The chapter refers to the following paper included in this dissertation.
• Kamm, L., Willemson, J.: Secure Floating-Point Arithmetic and Private
Satellite Collision Analysis. International Journal of Information Security
pp. 1–18 (2014).
This paper [49] introduces the floating-point data type and contains the
algorithms for floating-point addition and multiplication, and elementary
functions like inversion, square root and exponentiation of e. It also gives
the privacy-preserving adaptation of an algorithm that calculates the chance
of a pair of satellites colliding in Earth’s orbit. The performance results
of floating-point arithmetic, elementary functions, as well as the satellite
collision analysis are included in the paper. The author adapted floating-
point arithmetic for the privacy-preserving setting in collaboration with Jan
Willemson. The author implemented and optimised the privacy-preserving
versions of the arithmetic. The author also designed, implemented and op-
timised the privacy-preserving versions of the elementary functions in col-
laboration with Jan Willemson. In addition, the author implemented and
optimised the privacy-preserving satellite collision analysis method, con-
ducted the benchmarking experiments and analysed performance results.
The author of this dissertation is the first author of the paper.
Chapter 5 describes how we designed and implemented a statistical suite for
privacy-preserving statistical analysis.
The chapter refers to the following papers included in this dissertation.
1. Bogdanov, D., Kamm, L., Laur, S., Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt, P., Talviste,
R., Willemson, J.: Privacy-preserving statistical data analysis on federated
databases. In: Proceedings of the Annual Privacy Forum, APF’14. LNCS,
vol. 8450, pp. 30–55. Springer (2014).
This paper [8] illustrates how using privacy-preserving statistical analy-
sis in a federated database setting can be beneficial. The paper describes
the Estonian X-Road environment that connects all governmental databases
and how to combine it with secure multi-party computation for privacy-
preserving statistical analysis and decision making. The paper also refers
to an end-user study, that the authors carried out, validating the need for
such a solution. The practical implementation of the solution and a pilot
project are described, and some algorithms for secure multi-party statistical
analysis are given, along with benchmark results. The author designed and
14
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implemented the privacy-preserving statistical analysis methods and sys-
tematised the deployment models. The author is the first author of Sections
5–7 of this paper and shares first authorship with Riivo Talviste, who is the
first author of Sections 2–4 of this paper.
2. Bogdanov, D., Kamm, L., Laur, S., Sokk, V.: Rmind: a tool for crypto-
graphically secure statistical analysis. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2014/512 (2014).
This paper [9] contains the descriptions of a comprehensive set of algo-
rithms for a standard statistical study. The design and implementation de-
tails of a tool for privacy-preserving statistical analysis—RMIND—are given
along with performance results. The author designed the privacy-preserving
versions of the algorithms and implemented about half of them. The author
of this dissertation is the first author of the paper.
Chapter 6 describes the practical culmination of the work done for this disserta-
tion. The SHAREMIND team is using the implemented statistics suite in a national-
scale privacy-preserving joint statistical study. We give an overview of this study
and the work that has been done to make this unprecedented project possible. The
author has supervised further development of the statistical suite. She has collabo-
rated with the project team in the analysis and design of this statistical study. Her
most significant contribution is the design of the algorithms and methods used in
the privacy-preserving extract, transform, load (ETL) process.
CHAPTER 2
STATISTICS AND SECURE
MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION
2.1 Statistical analysis
Statistical analysis is a way of finding patterns and trends about the subjects of
the data. There are different ways of obtaining data, such as asking people to fill
out questionnaires, applying for access to central registries, measuring objects or
processes and their different results, and analysing data logs.
In this dissertation, we mostly focus on the comparison of two groups or co-
horts, called case and control groups. These two groups are formed based on some
traits that differentiate the two groups, such as age, gender, the presence or sever-
ity of disease, education level for people, and successful or failed execution for
processes. The statistical analyst poses a hypothesis about the difference of these
two groups based on some attribute other than the ones that distinguish the two
groups. For example, the hypothesis can state that students working during their
studies graduate later than their fellows who are not working.
Based on the assumptions known to hold for the available data, different tests
can be chosen to compare these two groups and confirm whether the hypothesis
holds or not. In the standard setting, the testing process usually works in the fol-
lowing way: data are analysed according to the testing algorithm, the test statistic
is returned, the p-value is calculated based on the test statistic and compared to
the significance threshold specified by the statistical analyst. The probability of
successfully accepting the alternative hypothesis when the null hypothesis does
not hold is called the power of the test. The power depends on how different the
alternative hypothesis is from the null hypothesis and how well the chosen test is
able to distinguish between the two.
A test statistic gives the analyst a measure that summarises the data in one
number. The test statistic is used to distinguish the null hypothesis from the alter-
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Figure 2.1: The mechanics behind statistical testing
native hypothesis posed by the analyst. The test statistic is computed differently
for each different statistical test. For instance, the t-test compares the means of
two populations, whereas the χ2 test statistic is based on the difference of the
actual distribution and the expected distribution in the groups.
To interpret the different test statistics, social scientists and statistical analysts
use p-values. The p-value shows how probable it is to compute a test statistic at
least as extreme as the one received as a result of the statistical test if, in actuality,
the null hypothesis holds. If this probability is lower than a threshold determined
by the analyst (usually 0.05 for single tests and 10−5 in genome-wide association
studies, where multiple tests are done at once), the alternative hypothesis can be
considered more plausible than the null hypothesis.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the notion of hypothesis testing using the p-value. These
violin plots depict the distribution of the test statistic under different hypotheses.
The null hypothesis H0 has a p-value cut-off and alternative hypotheses that have
p-values at least as extreme as that of the null hypothesis are considered plausible.
In this particular case, we consider two alternative hypotheses H1 and H2. If H1
holds, a large part of the distribution of the test statistic is between the cut-off lines
and, thus, the test is not well suited for distinguishing between hypothesesH0 and
H1. However, when H2 holds, the test statistic is above the cutoff threshold and
the test can distinguish between hypotheses H0 and H2 well.
Personal data processing is always closely connected with issues of privacy.
Whether we are dealing with income, health, behaviour or location data, we are
working with sensitive information. Often pseudonymisation techniques are ap-
plied to deal with this issue, other times data controllers pre-aggregate the data
or add noise before releasing them for analysis. This dissertation investigates
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whether secure multi-party computation can be used as a method for preserving
the privacy of the individuals contributing their data.
Before moving on, note that there are two orthogonal aspects of privacy we
can consider. On one hand, how much side information in addition to the desired
results is leaked, and, on the other hand, what the desired results leak about indi-
vidual data records. The former can be addressed using cryptographic methods.
The latter is described by output privacy. Intuitively, a study is considered output
private if the results reveal nothing important about the input values. More for-
mally, we consider a statistical study output-private, if the results reveal nothing
about the input values [6]. This is a very strong statement, therefore we consider
different levels of output privacy. On one end, the ideal level leaks no informa-
tion about the input values, on the other end, on the no level everything about the
inputs can be deduced from the outputs. What we actually try to achieve is the
reasonable level where nothing important about the inputs can be deduced from
the outputs.
The question whether a statistical function offers output privacy is a topic
that has been well studied in statistics. Methods, such as k-anonymity [70], l-
diversity [57], t-closeness [55] and differential privacy [29] are often employed
for this purpose. Of these methods, differential privacy is specially designed to
achieve output privacy, the other three contribute indirectly by adding noise to
the inputs. Although we consider this an important direction of research, we do
not handle these topics in this dissertation. In our experimental studies, we as-
sume that a privacy risk assessment is conducted to evaluate the leakage of private
information through the outputs and modify them on a case-by-case basis.
Instead, we look at cryptographic privacy. We consider a statistical study to
be cryptographically private if the results reveal only the values that are desired as
outputs. Our algorithms return values in a privacy-preserving format. Which of
these values can be opened and given as a result to the analyst must, at present, be
determined by the study plan. We hope to find a more automatic solution to this
topic during our future research into ensuring output-privacy in secure multi-party
computation. The task is not as simple as applying one of the studied methods,
as we have to take into account the output precision and privacy leakage trade-off
that these methods entail.
2.2 Secure multi-party computation
Secure multi-party computation (SMC) is a technology with which two or more
parties compute a function without seeing any private input values but their own.
There are different flavours of general SMC. The underlying technology of cur-
rent methods can be secret sharing [5, 21], garbled circuits [73], or homomorphic
18
Functionality Notation
Protected storage of a private value x
[[x]]
(signed integer, floating-point, boolean)
Conversion to the private form [[x]]← x
Support for value vectors and matrices [[x]] and [[M]]
Privacy-preserving binary operations
[[z]]← [[x]]~ [[y]]
(signed integer, floating point, boolean)
Privacy-preserving functions [[y]]← f([[x]])
Declassify value to computing parties declassify([[x]])
Publish value to result parties publish([[x]])
Private shuffling, linking and sorting —
Table 2.1: Secure computation capabilities and notation for statistical analysis algorithms.
encryption [60, 37]. The main idea is to perform operations on data without seeing
their values. We also introduce three different party roles to help with explaining
which parties can see what and who is in charge of certain operations. These three
roles include input parties, who secret-share or encrypt the data. They send the
values to the computing parties, who perform the operations that have been agreed
upon on the hidden data without seeing the values of the private inputs. They send
the encrypted or secret-shared data to the result parties, who decrypt or declassify
the values to see the results. A party can take on one or several of these roles.
Even though the protocols in this dissertation can be used in every setting that
supports the underlying basic operations that we need for our computations, our
implementation and the benchmark results are done using additively homomor-
phic secret sharing.
Our algorithms assume that the privacy-preserving operations listed in Ta-
ble 2.1 from [9] are available for use. These secure operations on secret-shared
data are used as building blocks in the algorithms proposed in this dissertation.
Let us look at this setting more closely. Let Z be a quotient ring. To secret-
share a value x ∈ Z among n computing parties, the input party uniformly selects
x1, . . . , xn−1 from Z and computes the n-th share as xn = x− x1 − xn−1. Each
share is sent to the corresponding computing party who learns nothing about the
received uniform value without colluding with other computing parties. There
are protocols that help the computing parties process the data to obtain the results
that the result parties ask for. Some of these protocols are fairly straightforward,
e.g., addition and multiplication, but some, e.g., bit extraction, are more complex
requiring the use of subprotocols. We also require that the protocols be universally
composable, meaning that the protocol remains secure even if side computations
19
are done in parallel, e.g., another protocol, potentially using the same data, is
scheduled to run at the same time.
There are several practical implementations of secure multi-party computa-
tion systems. Secure integer arithmetic is available in Fairplay [58], SEPIA [16],
TASTY [42], VIFF [36], SPDZ [25], SHAREMIND [6], and PCF [52]. Floating
point arithmetic has been considered in [20, 35]. Shuffling and sorting have been
implemented by the authors of [40] and linking has been implemented in [30].
We use the SHAREMIND platform [6] for our practical experiments. The SHARE-
MIND protocols are described in [12, 13] and the detailed composability proofs
are given in [10].
Several practical prototype applications have also been implemented. Ta-
ble 2.2 from [8] describes them within the party role paradigm that we introduce.
We often need to work with private and public data in parallel, as some values
do not need to be secret-shared, such as classifier element descriptions or other
publicly available information. For this, we bring in the distinction between these
values in algorithms. All the public values are denoted in the usual manner as x,
and private values are denoted as [[x]]. Similarly, we denote private vectors as [[y]]
and matrices as [[A]].
The SHAREMIND platform has its own language SECREC [11] that can be
used to implement algorithms on the SHAREMIND platform. This language pro-
vides the programmer with the means to distinguish between private and public
data types and the appropriate protocols for the operations are chosen automati-
cally, so the programmer does not have to worry about this.
An interesting aspect of solutions such as SHAREMIND is the fact that paralle-
lisation can greatly speed up the working time of algorithms. This is due to the
fact that most protocols require the computing parties to send some data between
each other and the network messages are often not filled optimally so the running
time does not grow linearly in the number of inputs. When the network channel
becomes saturated, the running time grows linearly with respect to the number of
inputs. The number of inputs at which the protocol saturates the network channel
is called the saturation point and knowing its estimated value in certain network
conditions helps the system to optimise the running time of secure computation.
At the other end, there is a point where all resources are used up and computations
become very slow. To avoid reaching this point, SHAREMIND uses batches that
are created with sizes based on the network connection parameters. See Figure 2.2
taken from [9] for an illustration of this concept.
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Basic deployment model Example applications
I C Rk SMC
The classic millionaires’ problem [73]
Parties: Two—Alice and Bob (both ICR)
Overview: Millionaires Alice and Bob use SMC to deter-
mine who is richer.
Joint genome studies [48]
Parties: Any number of biobanks (all ICR)
Overview: The biobanks use SMC to create a joint
genome database and study a larger population.
I C k SMC  R m
Studies on linked databases [8]
Parties: Ministry of Education, Tax Board, Population
Register (all IC) and Statistics Bureau (R).
Overview: Databases from several government agencies
are linked to perform statistical analyses and tests.
I R k SMC  C m
Outsourcing computation to the cloud [37]
Parties: Cloud customer (IR) and cloud service
providers (all C).
Overview: The customer deploys SMC on one or more
cloud servers to process her/his data.
I C Rk SMC  IR m
Collaborative network anomaly detection [16]
Parties: Network administrators (all IR) a subset of
whom is running computing servers (all ICR).
Overview: A group of network administrators uses SMC
to find anomalies in their traffic.
I  k SMC   CRn
 C m
The sugar beet auction [15]
Parties: Sugar beet growers (all I), Danisco and DKS
(both CR) and the SIMAP project (C).
Overview: Sugar beet growers and their main customer
use SMC to agree on a price for buying contracts.
I  k SMC   Rn
 C m
The Taulbee survey [34]
Parties: Universities in CRA (all I), universities with
computing servers (all IC) and the CRA (R).
Overview: The CRA uses SMC to compute a report of
faculty salaries among CRA members.
Financial reporting in a consortium [14]
Parties: Members of the ITL (all I), Cybernetica, Mi-
crolink and Zone Media (all IC) and the ITL board (R).
Overview: The ITL consortium uses SMC to compute a
financial health report of its members.
Table 2.2: SMC deployment models and example applications
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Figure 2.2: Performance model of secure computation protocols based on secret sharing.
2.3 Peculiarities of statistical analysis in the secure
multi-party setting
2.3.1 Data import
When importing data from different sources, the issue of missing values arises
quickly. There is a distinct difference between whether a value is zero or simply
missing. Whereas in the usual setting, missing values can be denoted as empty
fields or by entering NA (not available) instead of the value, this is not so straight-
forward in the privacy-preserving setting. Even though it is possible to encode the
missing value as not available using some chosen value, finding these values later
using the private comparison is expensive time-wise.
As data storage is cheap in comparison with processing power, we propose an
alternative solution of adding an extra column for each column that can contain
missing values. We call this mask vector the availability vector. More specifically,
if a column can contain missing values, i.e., it is not a key column, a separate
Boolean vector will be created for each such column when data is secret-shared
by the input parties. This so-called availability vector is, essentially, a mask vector
that contains 0 if the value is missing and 1 if the value is available. Storing the
information in such a manner makes it easier to work with the data and eliminate
the missing values on the fly.
2.3.2 Filtering and secure formation of case and control groups
Similarly to the availability vector, we use the mask vector idea for filtering. As
most times we do not want to reveal the size of the dataset after it has been fil-
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Figure 2.3: Difference of database filtering in the usual and privacy-preserving settings
tered, i.e., we do not want to show how many records correspond to the specified
filter conditions, our solution differs from the methods used in standard databases.
Usually, filtering returns a set of records that correspond to the filter, whereas our
solution returns a secret-shared mask vector that can later be used in computations
together with the original dataset. See Figure 2.3 for a visual representation of the
differences between the two settings. Only the records that have the mask value 1
will be used in the computations and the user will not see which records are used.
Sometimes, however, the number of records must be revealed to the user be-
cause the analysis or study design requires it. In such cases, the set of records
corresponding to the filter can be compiled obliviously, so that no additional in-
formation about the values is revealed, except for the number of filtered records.
In the following, we refer to this type of filtering as cutting the dataset or using
the cut function described in [9, Algorithm 1].
2.3.3 Statistical testing paradigms
We introduce three new paradigms for statistical testing in the privacy-preserving
setting. Figure 2.4 is based on the work in [9] but we expand this a bit and add
Option 3 to the privacy-preserving setting.
As mentioned before, the testing process in the usual setting is quite straight-
forward, starting with the test statistic and the p-value being computed and com-
pared to the significance threshold set by the analyst. In the privacy-preserving
setting, there can be different concerns for data privacy that require the testing
process to be modified to some extent. Let us look at the three options described
on Figure 2.4 that can be used in the privacy-preserving setting.
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Figure 2.4: Different statistical testing paradigms in the public and private setting
As with most issues in the privacy-preserving setting, these options offer a
time-privacy trade-off. Option 1 can be used when the test statistic and sample
sizes can be declassified. The p-value can then be computed in public, making
statistical testing significantly faster. Option 2 offers somewhat better privacy by
revealing only the sample sizes but not the computed test statistic. Using the
sample sizes and the chosen significance threshold, the analyst can look up or
calculate the critical test statistic based on the test being performed. The critical
statistic will then be compared to the test statistic received during the testing pro-
cess. This option is important, for example, in genome-wide association studies,
where revealing the p-values can already leak whether a donor’s sample is in the
chosen dataset or not [43]. This problem will be further discussed in Chapter 3.
Option 3 offers the best privacy guarantee, as only the comparison result is
revealed to the analyst. However, this reveals very little information and might
not always be acceptable to statistical analysts who are used to seeing p-values as
well. In addition, this option is the slowest as the p-value has to be computed in
the privacy-preserving setting. The third option is also the closest to the standard
setting with the exception that all operations are done in a privacy-preserving
manner.
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2.4 Related work
Statistical analysis tasks have been attempted and successfully carried out in a se-
cure multi-party setting before. We look at the most prominent statistical analysis
protocols that have been published along with practical implementations. Most
of these prototype applications work in the deployment model where all parties
have all party roles, i.e., they all input data, perform computations and receive the
results. This is the first model in Table 2.2.
One notable exception is the system proposed by Chida et al. [22] where the
computing parties are separated from the others similarly to the third model in Ta-
ble 2.2. Their system includes descriptive statistics, filtering, cross-tabulation and
versions of the t-test and χ2 test. They implement their set of privacy-preserving
statistical analysis operations based on Shamir’s secret sharing scheme as a back-
end for the R environment, meaning that the analyst who is familiar with R can
start working on the data immediately with a short study period. Additionally,
they allow both public and private computations and the performance results are
impressive. However, only the commands of their R module can be used on pri-
vate data, and other R commands work on public data. In addition, they only
support private integer operations and cannot, therefore, use more complex statis-
tical tools—such as linear regression—that are most commonly used by statistical
analysts. Their implementation also lacks the ability to link different database
tables.
El Emam et al. [30] describe protocols for linking databases and computing
the χ2 test, odds ratio and relative risk. They base their work on the Paillier
cryptosystem [60] and their protocols work on integer data, letting the result party
perform the final division in the standard setting.
Different components of a set of statistical analysis tools have been imple-
mented by different authors. Multiple ideas for implementing weighted sums,
mean and variance of integer data are considered in [19] using private information
retrieval (PIR), homomorphic encryption, and general secure multi-party compu-
tation. Special protocols for scalar products using oblivious transfer and homo-
morphic encryption are given in [27]. The latter, however, were proven to be
insecure in [38].
In [28], the authors look at multivariate linear regression and classification
in the two-party setting, where the data are vertically partitioned and distributed
between the two parties, making the approach very setting-specific. The compu-
tation of mean in the two-party setting is investigated in [50]. The authors of this
paper also use a two-party protocol that is tailored for this setting.
Filtered sums are considered in [69] and scalar products are similarly inves-
tigated in [72]. The Paillier homomorphic cryptosystem is used for both imple-
mentations. Another reformulation of scalar product as weighted sums over ho-
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momorphically encrypted data is considered in [47]. Private data aggregation of
streaming data has been considered in [67, 56].
It is easy to see, that even though many different statistical analysis functions
have been considered previously, it would be difficult, to incorporate all of these
protocols into one simple statistical analysis suite. In addition, only a few of these
protocols provide cryptographic privacy. Therefore, we find that our research
into combining a comprehensive tool for privacy-preserving statistical analysis is
justified.
2.5 Security proofs
This subsection gives the security framework in which this dissertation operates.
We do not provide detailed proofs for all our algorithms, but rather we rely on
the security of the underlying protocols and their property of being universally
composable.
First, let us look at universal composability. A protocol is considered to be
universally composable if it remains secure even if side computations are done
in parallel [18]. This means that other instances of the same protocol or other
protocols can be scheduled to run at the same time or in sequence and this will
not leak additional information about the inputs. Protocols that use universally
composable subprotocols are universally composable as well [18].
Second, we assume, that the evaluation of arithmetic circuits is secure and
universally composable. On the SHAREMIND platform the proof framework for
the arithmetic circuits and universal composability is presented in [10]. This pro-
vides us with cryptographic security on the condition that only the desired output
is declassified during computation.
Let us look at the situation where we need to declassify some intermediate
values during computation to reduce the number of branching decisions in the
protocol. In SMC, each branch has to be completed and then the right result will
be chosen using oblivious choice. Consider the following example:
a ← {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
b ← {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
if (a == 5) {
b = b + 1
a = a + b
} else {
a = b + 7
}
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In this example, there is a branching decision based on whether a is equal to five,
and two branches are created. One possible solution to performing this kind of
computation without declassifying the comparison result, is to convert the pro-
gram with branching into an arithmetic circuit where both branches are evaluated
and the output of the right branch is selected obliviously. For our example, one
possible solution is the following:
a ← {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
b ← {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
c = b + 1
d = a + c
e = b + 7
s = (a == 5)
a = s · d + (1 - s) · e
b = s · c + (1 - s) · b
Computations in all branches have to be performed, otherwise the algorithm leaks
data about the condition used in the branching decision.
Often, there are too many branches to go through in feasible time. Then the
condition on which a branching decision is made is explicitly declassified and the
decision is made based on a public condition. In the declassification case, the
algorithm explicitly states, that a private value is made public and this makes it
clear that the decision leaks something. This information can be used in the secu-
rity analysis of the algorithm. For each case, where this premature declassification
method is used, we need to provide a separate reasoning for why the protocol re-
mains secure, as we can no longer rely on the security proofs of the underlying
protocols.
It is not always clear whether additional declassifications weaken the security
or not as can be seen from the following example. Consider the situation where
we want to know how many elements in a secret-shared vector [[a]] correspond to
a condition. The easiest way is to declassify vector [[a]] and compare the values to
the condition in public. It is clear that this leaks both the values and the records
that corresponded to the condition. Taking this further, we can perform the com-
parison in the privacy-preserving setting if the comparison protocol is available.
Let us denote the Boolean vector of comparison results by [[b]]. We can now de-
classify this vector. This does not leak the original values in the vector. However,
it leaks which records corresponded to the condition, and thus leaks information
about those records. To counter this, we can shuffle [[a]] before comparison, and
later declassify the comparison results. This does not leak the values of the orig-
inal vector nor does it leak the locations of the values that corresponded to the
condition. Alternatively, we can use the circuit based solution, where we oblivi-
27
[[x1]] [[xn]]
[[y1]] [[ym]]
x1, · · · , xn
(y1, . . . , ym, z) f(x1, . . . , xn)
[[y1]], · · · , [[ym]]
...
...
Ideal world Hybrid world
[[x1]] [[x2]]
z
+
[[x3]] [[x4]]
·
Div
[[x1]] + [[x2]] [[x3]] · [[x4]]
[[x1]]+[[x2]]
[[x3]]·[[x4]]
Figure 2.5: Ideal world and hybrid world
ously sum the elements of the unshuffled [[b]] and declassify the sum as the desired
result s. This gives us the result we need without having to use additional classi-
fication during the execution of the algorithm.
The proofs for the additional declassifications given in the paper [9] work in
the hybrid setting. Proofs using the ideal and hybrid model setup are standard
tools in cryptography [17, 19, 39, 24]. We give an illustrative explanation of the
concept using Figure 2.5. In this setup, we look at two different functionalities—
the ideal functionality and the hybrid functionality. The ideal functionality is
an incorruptible party that gets all inputs, computes the function and outputs the
results. In the hybrid world we have modules of secure functionality, such as
addition, multiplication, comparison, division, declassification, shuffle, sort. We
assume that the security of these protocols has been proven and that they can be
composed into a more complicated algorithm without breaching that security.
For the example in Figure 2.5, we assume that we have three parties partici-
pating in our SMC protocol. The triple wires represent a secret shared value being
transmitted, each wire comes from a different party. The single separate wire that
can be seen in the example in the ideal world, represents an unclassified value be-
ing transmitted. The ideal world, therefore, outputs a tuple of secret-shared values
(y1, . . . , ym) and a public value z in the figure. A semi-honest adversary in this
setting can be viewed as a party that can see the values being transmitted on the
wires that correspond to corrupted computing parties. In the malicious model, the
adversary can also change the values on these wires.
The hybrid model gives a circuit that uses the different building blocks that are
provided by secure protocols. An explicit branching choice in the hybrid world is
hard to depict on such a structure without introducing public multiplexing. Alter-
natively, we can model public branching by dynamically constructing the circuit
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Figure 2.6: Adversaries in the ideal and hybrid world
based on the public decisions made with the help of premature declassification.
To prove that an algorithm that employs premature declassification is private,
we show that the protocol in the hybrid world is equivalent to the ideal world
from the point of view of the adversary A. Essentially, we need to show that we
are able to simulate the declassified values to the adversaryA so thatA is not able
to distinguish between the two worlds. In the examples we discussed, it is easy
to see that for the first case, knowing the number of elements corresponding to a
condition does not give us the capability of simulating the values in the original
vector. In the second case where we declassify the comparison result vector [[b]],
we cannot simulate the correct order knowing the number of elements. In the final
example, the simulation is trivial, as the sum is the number of vector elements that
correspond to the condition.
However, let us look more closely at the third example where we shuffled the
input vector, performed the comparison and then declassified the results. Fig-
ure 2.6 shows this example in the ideal and real world. In the ideal world, we
input the vector [[a]] and as a result, we receive the number of elements s that
corresponded to our condition. In the hybrid world, we use the blocks for shuffle,
comparison (CMP) and declassification (Dec) to compose our algorithm. Let A
be a static semi-honest adversary in the hybrid world and let us assume that A is
corrupting the third party in our example. This means that A can see all of that
party’s inputs and outputs in addition to all of the public values. The adversary
A can also have auxiliary information about the world that is based on something
outside the current algorithm, e.g., they can have additional information about
some inputs. This is depicted as the topmost arrow going into A.
We introduce the same adversary to the ideal world and create a simulator
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S. This simulator also sees the inputs of the third party in addition to the public
values. In our example, this means that S sees the input shares of the third party
and the returned value s. There are four inputs that S needs to simulate to A.
We do not consider that the auxiliary input is given to S as we want S to be
a general simulator that works with any adversary A and, thus, interpreting the
auxiliary input directly without the help of A is infeasible. For the first input, S
can relay the input values of the third party. For the second input, S can simulate
the shuffled values by uniformly choosing shares, because the shuffle protocol
also reshares the values in addition to changing their order. For the adversary,
this will be indistinguishable from the hybrid world if the distribution of shares is
equivalent. The third input can be simulated similarly to the second one.
The fourth input is the public result of the algorithm in the hybrid world. As
the simulator knows the number of values s corresponding to the condition, S can
randomly assign s ones to a zero-one vector. As the original values were shuffled,
the adversary does not know which comparison results correspond to which input
values. Hence, even if A has additional information about the inputs, their view
is still indistinguishable from the view in the hybrid world. The simulator and
hybrid world adversary together form the ideal world adversary A◦.
The described simulation construction shows only that the adversary cannot
learn anything during the protocol execution. However, after the protocol, addi-
tional information about the secret-shared protocol outputs might become avail-
able the adversary A. To show that this does not give an additional advantage to
the adversary compared to the ideal model, we must show that the joint output
distribution of all parties in the ideal an hybrid world coincides. However, when
the protocol is correct and we are working with a static semi-honest adversary,
this is not a problem as the outputs of the honest parties are the same in both mod-
els. In other settings, the formal reasoning is more difficult, as the adversary can
influence the outputs of honest parties in the hybrid model. Further details can be
obtained from [61, 39, 24].
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CHAPTER 3
SECURE GENOME-WIDE
ASSOCIATION STUDIES
3.1 Motivation
The need to merge gene banks of different countries for joint genome-wide asso-
ciation studies (GWAS) has been a topic of discussion for several years. The Es-
tonian Genome Center at the University of Tartu (EGCUT) has collaborated with
scientists form different countries by giving them genotype and phenotype data
that have been gathered from Estonian donors1. This kind of sharing, however,
requires rigorous procedures to be followed as the personal data being processed
is considered highly sensitive medical information [31, 63]. This process usu-
ally involves the participating institutions to apply for an Ethics Committee (EC)
approval for the studying and sharing of these data.
The EC approvals take time to obtain and the study has to be very well defined
beforehand. But what if the study is observational, what if the scientists do not
yet know whether there is a basis for their hypotheses or whether they are so
improbable that there is no point in looking in the chosen direction? It would be
useful if there were a technology with which to do this preliminary testing for
trend to see if there is a basis for the posed hypothesis or not. Only after a positive
preliminary result is found, will the study be fully specified, the EC approval
obtained and the analyses carried out.
Usually, statistical studies benefit from extra data as new dimensions can be
added to the analyses. With this in mind, the National Institute of Health (NIH)
in the USA published ratios of SNP alleles used in different case-control stud-
ies [23] assuming that it is virtually impossible to split a DNA mixture into indi-
vidual genotypes. However, it has been shown that it is indeed possible to identify,
1Research projects of EGCUT: http://www.geenivaramu.ee/en/projects
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with high probability, whether a specific donor’s DNA is present the mixture [43].
Now consider that case-control groups are formed based on phenotype data. For
instance, the study could be looking at a specific age group in different genders.
In most cases, this is not harmful, as the attackers are looking for a certain person
and most probably already have this information about their target as for most
people this information is inferable. On the other hand, case and control groups
can be formed based on sensitive health or disease information, which many peo-
ple would prefer to keep private. Again, we see the need for a technology with
which data can be shared and analysed without revealing their contents.
Secure multi-party computation (SMC) seemed to be a good solution to this
problem in theory. However, a practical solution using this technology adds a
significant overhead to computation time. SMC had been successfully used in
practice for Danish sugar beet auctions [15] and for analysing financial data [14].
We wanted to go a step further to find out whether this technology could also
be applied to provide bioinformaticians with the possibility to carry out privacy-
preserving large-scale GWAS. The problem was twofold—firstly, we wanted to
see whether the data analysis algorithms could be implemented using existing
technology which is based on integer arithmetic, and, secondly, whether the im-
plemented methods would be fast enough to be feasible in practical use with large
genotype databases.
3.2 Genome-wide association studies
A single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP, pronounced snip) in humans is a vari-
ation in the DNA sequence where a single nucleotide differs in paired chromo-
somes, see Figure 3.1. Although all four nucleotides (adenine (A), cytosine (C),
guanine (G), and thymine (T)) can be located in a SNP site, usually only two al-
leles A and B are considered instead. The first (A) corresponds to the reference
sequence and the second (B) represents potential mutations. SNP data is stored
as pairs of chromosomes in text format. The possible data pairs are AA, AB, BB,
and NN if the measurement could not be completed for some reason.
First, we found out what the most commonly used statistical analysis methods
are for GWAS. Most often, the dataset is divided into case and control groups
and then a standard χ2 test for trend is applied. We also looked into three more
specific tests that, for reasonable sample sizes, are also distributed according to the
χ2 distribution. Namely, we chose the χ2 test that looks at the equiproportionality
of allele A in both groups [71], the Cochran-Armitage test for trend [4, 66] and
the transmission disequilibrium test [68] that is applicable only in a more distinct
case, specifically when we are dealing with parent-child trios.
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Figure 3.1: Single-nucleotide polymorphism in paired chromosomes
3.3 Our solution
Our solution is described in detail in the article [48]. For our specific technological
platform, we decided to use the SHAREMIND secure multi-party computation sys-
tem. Our aim was to show that secure computations for specific problems can be
performed fast when implemented using a generalised platform without spending
too much time designing a very problem-specific program.
The first obstacle we faced was how to encode the data into the database. At
that time, the SHAREMIND database could only hold integer data, but as men-
tioned in Section 3.2, SNP data are stored in text format. Today, it is possible
to store also floating-point numbers, Boolean values and text values in a SHARE-
MIND database. However, the actual statistical tests are done not on the text but
on the counts of alleles A and B in each SNP. So even with the capabilities of the
platform available today, we would not store the data as text but would opt for a
categorical data representation instead.
If the SNP data contained only A and B, it would be possible to encode these
data as one vector, where the element holds the count of allele A and the count of
allele B can be calculated by subtracting the count of allele A from 2. However,
as not all SNPs can be measured for all donors, we decided to use two vectors
instead of one to store these data.
Consider a pair of integers (A,B) where A is the count of allele A and B is
the count of allele B in the current SNP. This means that pairs AA, AB, BB and
NN are encoded as (2, 0), (1, 1), (0, 2), and (0, 0), respectively. Hence, we have
twice the number of data vectors that we would have if we stored the data as text.
See Tables 3.1 and 3.2 for an example. In this format, the allele counts for the χ2
tests can be calculated easily, however, the calculation will take extra time for the
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Donor ID SNP1 SNP2 SNP3
123 AA AB NN
124 AA AB AB
125 BB BB AB
Table 3.1: SNP data in text format
Donor ID SNP1 A SNP1 B SNP2 A SNP2 B SNP3 A SNP3 B
123 2 0 1 1 0 0
124 2 0 1 1 1 1
125 0 2 0 2 1 1
Table 3.2: SNP data given as counts of alleles A and B
Cochran-Armitage test.
Having found a solution for the data representation issue, we went on to im-
plement the tests in SECREC. For our test data, we chose 270 publicly available
genotypes from the HAPMAP project [45]. Each of the donors in that dataset has
262264 measured SNPs. The chosen test dataset gave us a real-world dataset size
and with it we ran into another problem area—we had never tested our SHARE-
MIND for such a large-scale analysis problem. The issue that we ran into first was
with how to store such a large dataset in the database as we needed each SNP to
be available as a separate element.
It turns out not to be a trivial task to find a database engine that can hold 270
rows and 524528 columns. Therefore, we transposed the database and created 270
columns and 524528 rows, instead. Essentially, such a step changes nothing in the
computation process, the only constraint is, that the underlying database engine
must be capable of querying row vectors in acceptable time. As most statistical
analyses are focused on aggregations based on attribute columns (e.g., count of
allele A, average age, average salary of all data donors), database engines are
also quicker with these queries. The versions of SHAREMIND in use today can
also support 500000 columns, so this modification need not be done in order to
perform analyses on large-scale data any more.
The rest of the implementation was mostly straightforward as SECREC is a C-
like language. However, as mentioned in Section 2.3, filtered data in the privacy-
preserving setting are handled, where possible, not as a vector of values that cor-
respond to a filter but as a pair consisting of the original private value vector and
a private mask that indicates which values correspond to the filter. Hence, all of
the algorithms had to be composed bearing this in mind.
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Fortunately, this does not complicate matters too much, as we only need to
find the count of the occurrences of alleles A and B in each SNP in different
groups. If we multiply the data vector with the mask vector, we get the value 0,
where the element did not correspond to the filter, and the original value, where it
did. When we sum the elements of the obtained vectors, we get the needed sums
as unnecessary elements are obliviously changed to 0.
Another aspect that we needed to address was the fact that computing all of
the chosen test statistics T requires two values to be divided and then compared to
a significance threshold Tα. As we only had integer arithmetic available (without
division), we rewrote the equation T ≥ Tα in terms of integer operations. Let
Tα =
p
q and T =
x
y , then the condition can be written as
T ≥ Tα ⇐⇒ xq ≥ yp
and we can do all our calculations using only integer arithmetic.
Even though not all statistical functions can be transformed to work on integer
data, in the case of GWAS, integers are enough to perform the most widely-used
statistical tests. Moreover, as only one division is needed at the end of these
algorithms, most of the necessary calculations can be done on integers even when
division is available.
As mentioned in Section 2.2, a very important aspect of SHAREMIND is using
parallelisation in algorithms. This allows SHAREMIND to achieve greater speeds
during computation. Luckily, the calculation of statistics for GWAS can be opti-
mised very well. Namely, we can perform frequency calculation and hypothesis
testing on all of the 262264 SNPs in parallel. To further emphasise this point, we
measured performance results for the original 270 donors and also 540, 810 and
1080 donors.
It is clearly visible in [48, Table 4], that the majority of performance time
is spent on frequency calculation, which makes perfect sense, considering that
the filters have to be applied twice to all SNPs of all donors. The number of
necessary multiplications exceeds the saturation point and, therefore, the perfor-
mance results also show linear growth w.r.t. the number of donors. The evaluation
methods, however, have to be applied to less data and the saturation point is not
reached, which can be seen from the corresponding performance results in [48,
Table 5].
Unfortunately, the performance results are not as good as we would have
hoped, but they are not infeasible either. The results are 60 times slower than
the results we achieved with the public version. On one hand, waiting approxi-
mately two and a half hours instead of 15 seconds for test results is quite some
time. On the other hand, applying and waiting for the Ethics Committee approval
for a pilot study takes more than a month. If we go back to the scenario, where
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we are dealing with a pilot study to find out whether there is cause to look into the
data more deeply, the solution can be considered feasible in practice. Moreover,
with the new developments in the SHAREMIND platform, we estimate, that the
computations can be done at least 10 times faster.
In addition, as the performance results indicate, the majority of the computa-
tion time was spent on the calculation of frequency tables. A hybrid study can be
conducted, where each partner submits already pre-calculated frequencies into the
database for joint analysis of cohorts. This version is not as powerful and general
as we would like, but it speeds up the calculation drastically.
3.4 Impact of our work
Figure 3.2 depicts the algorithms we created and implemented for SHAREMIND
using SECREC. All of these algorithms are available in the supplementary mate-
rials of the paper [48]. Some of the algorithms and their implementations (i.e.,
allele counting, determining a genotype distribution, allele counting for homozy-
gous children, the Cochran-Armitage test and TDT), are data-specific and cannot,
therefore, be generalised to data from other fields of life. The range mask com-
pilation algorithm, on the other hand, is universal and can be used for any kind
of data. The two χ2 tests are specific in the sense that they are optimised for two
groups (allele A and B) whereas the general χ2 test can be used for n groups. But
otherwise, these tests can also be applied to any kind grouped data.
The implemented functionality is not available as a separate program as it
requires the use of the SHAREMIND platform. The filtering functionality and a
generalised version of the χ2 test have been incorporated into our statistics tool
which will be discussed further in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 4
FLOATING-POINT ARITHMETIC AND
SATELLITE COLLISION ANALYSIS
4.1 Motivation
Even though we were able to implement a privacy-preserving solution for genome-
wide association studies using rational arithmetic implemented on top of integers,
we found that such workarounds cannot easily be extended to the general case and
require special attention for each separate statistical problem that one encounters.
Our end goal was, however, to put together a statistical package that is similar to
R1 and other current data analysis tools that allow statisticians to perform analyses
regardless of the nature of the data.
The main challenge with this goal was the absence of efficient secure floating-
point numbers and arithmetic. So we set out to design and implement floating-
point arithmetic and some elementary functions on real numbers for the SHARE-
MIND system, namely inverse, exponentiation, square root, natural logarithm and
sine. The availability of floating-point arithmetic gives us the opportunity to also
design and implement other more complex algorithms and applications that would
not be possible using only integers.
4.2 Background
Most floating-point arithmetic implementations in modern computers follow the
standard IEEE 754 [44]. There is also a more generic presentation given in Section
4.2 of the book [51]. In these approaches, the representation of a floating-point
number N is split into the following parts:
• Base b,
1The R Project for Statistical Computing. http://www.r-project.org
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• Sign s,
• Significand f representing the significant digits of N ,
• Exponent e showing the number of places the radix point of the significand
needs to be shifted in order to produce the number N ,
• Bias q is a fixed number used to make the representation of e non-negative.
In most representations, the base is 2, but it can be 10 as well. The sign takes a
value 0 or 1 and corresponds to plus and minus signs respectively. The significand
usually belongs to a fixed interval like [1, 2) or [1/b, 1). Instead of the actual
exponent e, the floating-point representation stores a biased exponentE, such that
e = E − q. These notations give us the generic representation for floating-point
numbers:
N = (−1)s · f · bE−q .
In the standard representation, the computing entity has access to all the bits of
the representation. Hence, some optimisations are introduced into the representa-
tions, such as storing the sign, exponent and significand in one machine word and
leaving the leading digit of the significand out of the representation, as it is always
1 due to normalisation. Hence, before computation is carried out, the compressed
values are unpacked and after computation the result is once again packed. In
the standard single-precision (32-bit floating-point) representation, the sign takes
up 1 bit, the exponent 8 bits and the remaining 23 bits hold the significand. The
double-precision (64-bit floating-point) representation has a 1-bit sign, an 11-bit
exponent and a 52-bit significand. The base and bias are fixed beforehand and are
not stored in the number representation.
4.3 Our solution
4.3.1 Floating-point arithmetic
Our solution is described in detail in the article [49]. In this section we describe
the interesting design and implementation details that emerged during the process
of creating privacy-preserving floating-point arithmetic.
In case of an additive secret-shared representation of numbers, it is not as
straightforward to access the individual bits of the value as it is in the standard
representation. Separate bits can be accessed using bit extraction [12, 13] but this
involves a significant amount of computation and is, therefore, time-consuming.
Here, using bitwise shared values would be a solution. SHAREMIND supports
bitwise shared values, but does not have all the necessary operations for manip-
ulating these values that we need for floating-point arithmetic. Hence, we share
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the parts of floating-point values additively, and keep them in separate structures
inside the SHAREMIND platform. For the end-user, they will still be presented as
whole floating-point values.
This decision also makes the next design issue simpler for us—if we treat the
parts of floating-point numbers as separate integers, we can skip the packing and
unpacking steps. It is true that this constitutes a growth in memory consumption as
instead of one machine word, we now need almost twice as much space. However,
considering that currently in secure multi-party computation, the problem lies in
performance rather than storage, this choice was fairly easy to make.
Hence, our floating-point number consists of three separately shared values s,
e and f signifying the sign, the significand and the exponent. They are stored in 8,
16 and 32 bits, respectively. This choice was induced by the following reasoning.
Though the sign is only 1 bit, the shortest machine word in SHAREMIND is 8
bits, so a Boolean value is still stored in 8 bits. Therefore, it made sense to show
this explicitly and store the sign as an 8-bit unsigned integer. Additionally, the
necessary operations used to implement floating-point arithmetic were available
for unsigned integers values.
The choice of a 16-bit unsigned exponent instead of using 8 bits stems from
a performance concern, namely that there are two comparison protocols [13] in
SHAREMIND—a faster one that is based on bit shift right and works if the most
significant bit is 0, and a slower one that uses bit extraction and works in all
cases. If we use the standard 8-bit representation, we cannot ensure that the most
significant bit is 0, in fact in about half the cases it will not be, hence we would
have to use the slower comparison protocol. However, if we use more storage, we
can have a faster protocol. The tradeoff is sensible, as we want the protocol to
be as fast as possible at the cost of everything but precision. In fact, if we were
to compress our floating-point representation into machine words, we would need
two 32-bit words or one 64-bit word anyway. So in this sense, 8 bits versus 16
bits does not make a difference.
Computations on significands in the standard representation are performed
by first raising the significand to 32 bits and then truncating it after the result is
obtained. Therefore, we saw no reason to keep the significand smaller than the 32-
bit machine word. In fact, our computations are a bit more precise than the IEEE
operations due to this decision. For a comparison of the standard presentation and
our version see Figure 4.1.
When we get a standard floating-point number, we unpack it, share the dif-
ferent parts of the value separately, and keep it in our unpacked format while the
value is shared form. Upon declassification, we declassify the parts and, finally,
pack the number into the standard format.
We also allow double-precision floating-point values, where the sign and ex-
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Figure 4.1: Comparison of the standard single-precision floating-point presentation and
our solution
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Standard 64-bit floating-point value
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Figure 4.2: Comparison of the standard double-precision floating-point presentation and
our solution
ponent are stored in 8 and 16 bits, similarly to the 32-bit floating-point values.
The significand is stored using 64 bits. For this case, similar reasoning applies as
for the 32-bit case. For a comparison of the standard presentation and our version
see Figure 4.2.
For all components, we use unsigned integers of the mentioned length. The
sign is 1 if the value is positive and 0 if negative. This reversal of the standard
format allowed us to reduce the integer circuits that make up the floating-point
operations. In the case of exponents, we use all of the available 15 bits for storage,
leaving the highest bit free for optimisation purposes, hence introducing a bias of
214 − 1 for both single and double-precision values.
The significand represents the real number f = f · 2−32, i.e., the highest bit
of f corresponds to 12 , the second one to
1
4 and so forth. As with the standard
representation, we always normalise the significand after computations, i.e., we
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adjust the exponent so that the most significant bit of the significand is 1 unless
the number to be represented is zero. In the latter case, f = 0, s corresponds
to the sign of the value, and the exponent e is 0. Our single-precision floating-
point values achieve 32-bit significand precision, falling between IEEE single and
double-precision. The double-precision floating-point values achieve 64-bit sig-
nificand precision which is more than the IEEE double-precision numbers have.
In the standard representation of floating-point numbers, there are special val-
ues that represent exponent under- and overflows. Such exceptions as under- and
overflows, division by zero, square root of negative values, are problematic in
the case of secure multi-party computation. Error messages in the control flow
can leak information about the shared values which raises a serious issue. How-
ever, when writing a program using standard techniques and normal programming
languages, the programmer can take steps to avoid these kinds of exceptions by
finding out what the nature of the data is and using measures accordingly. For in-
stance, when there is a doubt that division by zero is a possibility in the algorithm,
the programmer can catch this error by comparing the divisor to zero, and at a
convenient point, giving an error message based on the comparison result. This
example can be seen in the algorithms for solving sets of linear equations in [9].
However, in the simple statistical measures that are described in this dissertation,
these exceptions rarely, if ever, occur. Furthermore, as our exponents are larger
than in the standard version, we can catch the overflow and, during declassifica-
tion, set the corresponding parameters in the standard representation.
As our floating-point data structure uses separate values to keep the compo-
nents, we can also introduce flags for overflow, underflow and values that are not
applicable, such as when dividing by zero. These will make the data structure
larger and the comparisons for over- and underflow will have to be done after
each addition and multiplication, but the flags will provide stricter guarantees that
these values will not be lost in some borderline cases. This will also make our
floating-point values more compatible with the IEEE standard. Note, that these
flags are not included in the current implementation.
We designed algorithms for adding and multiplying floating-point values that
use the described secret shared format, and implemented them for the SHARE-
MIND platform. Of the two, the multiplication protocol is the simpler one, as the
floating-point value representation is multiplicative. Essentially, we use the com-
parison protocol to determine the sign of the result and add exponents to get the
exponent of the result. To get the significand, we cast the n-bit argument signifi-
cands to 2n-bits and multiply those, truncate them to n bits again and normalise
the significand. Normalisation shifts the significand so that the significant bit is
one and adjusts the exponent according to the shift. For both addition and multi-
plication, we designed and implemented all the necessary subprotocols, including
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normalisation, casting between different bit widths and shifting a value right by a
secret number of bits. These subprotocols are described in [49].
Addition is a bit more complicated, but in general, we align the decimal points
of the values, and either add the values, if the signs are equal or subtract them,
otherwise. For addition, we need to cast the n-bit significands to 2n bits and back
after the addition and adjust the significand accordingly. For subtraction, we need
to normalise the result at the end as this operation can end with a non-normalised
significand.
4.3.2 Elementary functions
When we had privacy-preserving composable floating-point arithmetic, we were
able to go on to implement some elementary functions, namely inversion, square
root, sine, exponentiation of e, natural logarithm and error function. We used
Taylor series expansion for algorithm design and implementation as polynomial
evaluations use only addition and multiplication operations, and are, therefore,
perfect for our solution. They also offer data-independence which is important in
the privacy-preserving setting. Standard implementations of elementary functions
offer precision within a small relative error. Taylor series expansion allows us to
do the same.
The Taylor series of an elementary function is an infinite sum of terms that can
be used to approximate the corresponding elementary function at a given point.
The approximation is done by computing a finite number of terms. This allowed
us to introduce a time-precision trade-off. With Taylor series expansion, the more
elements are in the series, the more precise the result. Even though computing
fewer elements is significantly faster, it leaves us with a result that cannot be
considered precise enough.
In most computers today, elementary functions such as square root are cal-
culated in hardware. However, early personal computer processors such as Zilog
Z80 CPU as used in the Spectrum ZX often used Chebyshev polynomials [3]
to approximate the calculation of elementary functions. If arguments fall into
fixed intervals then Chebyshev polynomials can be used to achieve better preci-
sion with a smaller number of elements. The coefficients for the polynomials are
pre-calculated based on the desired precision and are faster to use in later calcula-
tions. As the current performance of secure computation is comparable with that
generation of computing hardware, we were inspired to try these polynomials in
our platform as well.
We implemented Chebyshev polynomials for inverse and exponentiation of
e as division is most commonly used in algorithms and the error function is the
slowest of the elementary functions. As Chebyshev polynomials exist for the other
functions as well, they can be easily implemented when need arises.
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Algorithm 1: Protocol for finding the sine of a floating-point value [[N ]]
with precision p
Data: Shared floating-point value [[N ]]
Result: Shared floating-point value [[N ′]] such that N ′ = sin(N) with
precision p
1 Evaluate the Taylor series [[N ′]]←∑pn=1 (−1)n−1(2n−1)! · [[N ]]2n−1
2 return [[N ′]]
In theory, higher order Chebyshev polynomials also provide better precision
similarly to Taylor series. In our implementation, however, we only provide al-
gorithms using a fixed number of elements, hence, the user cannot ask for better
precision at the cost of running time with the algorithms using Chebyshev polyno-
mials. For instance, Taylor series evaluation for inverse requires at least 32 sum-
mation terms to achieve the precision we need so we also implemented Chebyshev
polynomials for inverse using 7 elements. The significant performance gain justi-
fies the use of Chebyshev polynomials, however, we still leave the option of using
the slower Taylor series, if precision is paramount in an application.
As mentioned, the SHAREMIND platform uses parallelised computations to
achieve better performance. Thus, in our implementation, we perform as many
polynomial evaluation computations in parallel as possible.
Before moving to the specific functions, let us look more closely at how Taylor
series expansion works. With some clever tricks, we can modify our problem so
that we do not need to approximate the series over the whole real number range.
We call the range that interests us the region of approximation. We need to have
enough elements in the Taylor series, so that the approximation in the chosen
region has a small relative error.
Sine is the most straightforward of the elementary functions. It is a periodical
function, with its period spanning [−pi, pi], so its Taylor polynomial converges for
all real numbers modulo 2pi already at a few elements. Hence, we decided to start
with implementing this function to try out Taylor series expansion in practice.
As this algorithm is not given in [49], we include it here for completeness as
Algorithm 1.
Inversion is needed to implement division which is an essential operation in
statistical analysis and most other real-life applications. Division itself works,
as expected, by inverting the divisor and multiplying the result with the divi-
dend. Inverse converges best in the interval (0, 1], so we separate the significand
f ∈ [12 , 1) from the given floating-point number and, essentially, based on the
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Algorithm 2: Protocol for finding the natural logarithm of a floating-point
value [[|N |]] with precision p
Data: Shared floating-point value [[N ]]
Result: Shared floating-point value [[N ′]] such that N ′ = ln(|N |) with
precision p
1 Let [[f ]] be the significand of [[|N |]]
2 Set [[x]]← [[f ]]− 1
3 Evaluate the Taylor series [[lnf ]]←
∑p
n=1
(−1)n−1
n · [[x]]n
4 Set [[lne]]← [[e]] · ln(2)
5 return [[N ′]] = [[lnf ]] + [[lne]]
following equation, only inverse the significand using Taylor series:
1
f · 2e =
1
f
· 2−e .
Natural logarithm Taylor series only converge in the interval (0, 2]. Hence,
we separate the significand f ∈ [12 , 1) and base our algorithm on the fact that
ln(f · 2e) = ln(f) + e · ln(2) .
Similarly to the protocol for finding sine, we include the algorithm for finding the
natural logarithm in this dissertation for completeness. Algorithm 2 shows how
the natural logarithm is computed. First, we deal with the natural logarithm of the
significand. On line 1, a float [[f ]] is created containing the absolute value of the
significand of the original value [[N ]]. In our underlying representation this can
be achieved simply by setting the sign bit to be 1, leaving the significand of [[N ]]
untouched and setting the exponent to be 0.
Square root is the most complex of the elementary functions we implemented.
The convergence interval of the series is (0, 2). Thus, we first computed the square
root of the significand and then multiplied the result with a correcting exponential
term: √
f · 2e =
√
f · 2e/2 .
In addition, to avoid divergence for the square root of zero, the corresponding
result is obliviously set to zero at the end of the algorithm.
Exponentiation of e converges for all real numbers, however, the larger the
value, the higher the number of elements in the Taylor series has to be to keep ac-
ceptable precision. As expected, this increases the working time of the algorithm.
As a solution we changed bases from e to 2:
ex = (2log2 e)x = 2(log2 e)·x and
y = (log2 e) · x ≈ 1.44269504 · x .
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Now, knowing that 2y = 2[y]+{y} = 2[y] · 2{y}, where [y] denotes the integer part
and {y} the fractional part of y, we separated the integer and fraction parts of the
power y. As our floating-point works on base 2, we were able to simply construct
2[y] and compute 2{y} which is always in the interval (0, 2).
Error function is a function that describes diffusion and is defined as
erf(x) =
2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
.
It is used for approximating numerical integration which is needed for the satellite
collision analysis algorithm. At larger values, several elements are needed for
the Taylor series, hence, we did a rough approximation and checked whether the
exponent is larger or smaller than 3. This shows us whether x ∈ [−2, 2] and we
were able to obliviously set the result as ±1 according to the original sign [[s]].
4.3.3 Matrix operations
We implemented some of the most commonly used matrix operations, as these
are also often used in statistical analyses. Unit vector computation, scalar prod-
uct, cross product for vectors of length 3 and multiplication of two-dimensional
matrices were straightforward to implement in the privacy-preserving setting. We
also implemented a specific algebraic algorithm for computing the eigenvalue and
eigensystem for 2× 2 symmetric matrices.
4.4 Satellite collision analysis
As a validation of large-scale usage of floating-point arithmetic and the elemen-
tary functions, we used our brand new capabilities for implementing an algorithm
for satellite collision analysis in SECREC. Satellite collision analysis is more of a
geometric than a statistical problem, however parts of the analysis (mainly matrix
manipulations) can also be useful in statistical analysis.
In pragmatic terms, we chose satellite collision analysis as a prototype ap-
plication for floating-point because of its complexity. This analysis works on
floating-point data, uses most of the elementary functions we implemented, and
needs both high precision and relatively fast performance. With GWAS, the only
thing that can run out is the analyst’s patience. Satellite collision analysis, how-
ever, must be performed on a fixed number of satellite pairs during a fixed period,
e.g., in 24 hours, to find all possible collisions for the next period. Hence, we
are dealing with a more performance-critical problem, as delayed predictions can
leave too little time for avoiding a collision. Implementing this complex algo-
rithm helps us validate whether privacy-preserving computation can be used in a
performance-critical setting.
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On the other hand, we chose this problem, because it is an ideal setting for se-
cure multi-party computation—no country is willing to let other countries know
the location of their intelligence satellites, but they would also like their invest-
ment to stay safe. Secure multi-party computation could be used to analyse the
locations and let satellite owners know whether they need to steer their satellites
away from potential collision situations. Even though the privacy-preserving so-
lution is perfect for this problem, its use is a very delicate political decision for
countries for national security reasons. One of the difficulties is the decision of
how many collision probability queries and satellites can be allowed for one coun-
try so that they could not probe for the location of other satellites. Hence, it will
be some time until this solution will be used in practical applications.
We based our implementation on the algorithms from [1, 2, 41] that compute
the probability of collision between two spherical objects. For this, the support
for floating-point addition, multiplication, division, square root, exponentiation of
e, matrix and vector operations and integral computation is needed which requires
the use of error function computation.
4.5 Impact of our work
Figure 4.3 depicts the algorithms we created and implemented for SHAREMIND
using C++ and SECREC. The first layer in the new functionality section is imple-
mented in C++ and is an integrated part of code of the SHAREMIND platform.
The second layer contains the functionality necessary for performing privacy-
preserving satellite collision analysis and is implemented in SECREC as a standard
library.
For finding the collision probability, we need to compute a double integral.
We did this by using Simpson’s one-third rule for numerical integration. This rule
transforms the probability formula into a form which we can compute if we have
access to floating-point operations for multiplication, addition, division, square
root, exponentiation of e and the computation of the error function. Though we
implemented a version of this rule that is optimised this for the application specific
function, it can be modified to accept other functions when needed.
Detailed algorithms for our floating-point arithmetic and all elementary func-
tions except sine and natural logarithm are available in the paper [49]. These
two algorithms are included in this dissertation for completeness and their im-
plementations are included in the SHAREMIND system along with the rest. The
benchmark results indicate that our privacy-preserving application is fast enough
to work on the satellite collision problem in real time.
Today, the described floating-point arithmetic is used by the SHAREMIND
platform. The elementary functions have been further developed using fixed point
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Figure 4.3: Overview of operations implemented for the privacy-preserving floating-point
arithmetic and satellite collision analysis
computations and Chebyshev polynomials with more elements where possible.
The algorithms essentially follow the same pattern as the algorithms of this work,
but fixed-point computations are used when it is known where the decimal point
lies. For all our elementary functions, we fix the approximation range and with
this, the decimal point. For example, the inversion algorithm can utilise fixed
point computations during the phase where the significand f ∈ [12 , 1) is being
inversed. Fixed-point arithmetic is faster, as many of the special cases that occur
48
in floating-point, can be ignored.
These so-called hybrid floating-point functions are a continuation of this work
and are described in the article [53]. They offer significant speedup compared to
the versions described in this work. The elementary functions implemented in
C++, are available as function calls in the SECREC language.
Other members of our team have created another version of floating-point
arithmetic that is IEEE 754 compliant [62]. They use garbled circuits to design
and implement their operations on XOR-shared values in the secure multi-party
setting. Their implementation is faster than ours when run on fewer than a 100
floating-point values. Unfortunately, the solution does not scale very well and,
therefore, our solution outperforms theirs when more than 100 operations need to
be done in parallel. However, we intend to integrate the two solutions to use the
advantages of both.
As mentioned, the reusable vector and matrix algorithms are part of the stan-
dard library. The satellite collision analysis algorithm is used as a demo applica-
tion. Because of the nature of the SHAREMIND platform and the SECREC lan-
guage, the algorithms implemented in SECREC can use the newest and fastest
elementary functions available without being reimplemented.
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CHAPTER 5
A PRIVACY-PRESERVING
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SUITE
5.1 Motivation
In most areas of life, data are often gathered and stored for different reasons, be it
for archival, for finding customer shopping patterns, for detecting tax fraud, or for
better decision-making. Even though data are sometimes stored just because they
are available, it is often wise to analyse them and make some conclusions that
can be helpful for the business, for the government, or for the individuals whose
information has been gathered.
There are several different tools available for simplifying the statistical ana-
lysis process—SAS, SPSS, R, to name a few. Using these, the statisticians do
not have to implement all the necessary statistical tests every time they want to
analyse new data. These tools, however, can only process unencrypted data. It
is fairly simple to secret-share data and store them in a database. It is a different
matter to analyse them feasibly and in a manner that is easily approachable to a
data analyst who is used to working with unencrypted data where they can look at
individual values.
Our aim was to develop such a general tool that allows simple data analysis
for any kind of database. By this we mean a tool that allows the analyst to explore
the database and find a basis for more specific studies or simply get an overview
of the trends. We also wanted the tool to be intuitive and easy-to-use, e.g., similar
to an existing statistical analysis tool like R. We chose R because its core is open-
source, and hence it is easier to see, what kinds of algorithms are used within and
how we could integrate our own algorithms as a package of R. We decided to first
try to build the tool as a separate entity and later integrate it as an R package if
this was needed and reasonable.
This kind of general tool allows us to set up studies and analyses more easily,
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as some of the most often used tests and functions can be incorporated into the
tool. This leaves only the tests and functions that are analysis-specific or more
complex to be developed when need arises.
5.2 Background
Statistical analysis is a very wide and varied field. There are simple functions for
getting an overview of data and very complicated algorithms for finding interest-
ing details. We decided to focus on statistical tests and functions that are most
commonly used in practice and that are not extremely specific to a certain field.
If data have not been gathered or merged for a certain study, but are collected
and then analysed for interesting patterns, the analysts usually look at the values
to formulate hypotheses based on the data distribution. This kind of access to
the data is important for statistical analysts. Unfortunately, the privacy-preserving
setting does not allow the user access to individual records. Therefore, we looked
into descriptive statistics that allow us to give the analyst an overview of the data
and their distribution without revealing individual values. For this, we chose the
five-number summary that computes and returns the minimum, maximum, me-
dian, and 25% and 75% quantiles from a given vector. These statistics can be
visualised using box-plots that give the analyst a nice visual description of the
dataset or different groups within. We also decided to include an outlier detection
and elimination function based on quantile calculation.
We chose the histogram and heatmap for showing the distribution of data in a
dataset. A statistical tool also needs such components as mean, variance, standard
deviation, and covariance. From statistical tests, we decided to reimplement the
χ2 test as it is one of the most commonly used tests in statistical analysis. In our
first version of secure GWAS, we had to jump through hoops to perform this test
as we did not have floating-point arithmetic. We implemented Student’s t-test and
we also chose the Wilcoxon rank sum test as its non-parametric counterpart. In
addition, we implemented the paired t-test and, for completeness, the Wilcoxon
signed rank test that also works on paired data.
Correction algorithms for multiple testing are designed to account for alterna-
tive hypotheses that can be falsely accepted, if multiple tests are run on the same
data. Usually, the p-value cut-off is such that it is unlikely that the computed p-
value is at least as extreme as the threshold if the null hypothesis holds. However,
if several tests are run on the same data, it becomes more likely that one of these
tests returns a false positive. Hence, genome-wide association studies use multi-
ple testing when more than one SNP is being analysed at one time. We decided
to implement Bonferroni correction and the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure for
false discovery rate correction.
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The most complex algorithms we chose to implement, were those of predictive
modelling, mainly linear regression. For this, we looked at different algorithms
used to solve sets of linear equations, namely, Gaussian elimination with back
substitution, and LU decomposition. Additionally, we implemented the conjugate
gradient method for quadratic forms.
5.3 Our solution
5.3.1 Descriptive statistics and statistical tests
Our solution for the statistical analysis methods is described in the articles [8,
9]. In this section, we give an overview of the solution and bring out the more
interesting details of design and implementation of the methods in the privacy-
preserving setting.
As mentioned, descriptive statistics can give an analyst an overview of the
dataset without actually revealing individual records. For this purpose, we de-
signed and implemented two versions of the five-number summary. The first uses
the cut function and reveals the number of records corresponding to the filter. The
other is oblivious and does not reveal the number of records, but this comes at the
cost of increased running time. As mentioned previously, when data are filtered
in the privacy-preserving setting, the number of records that are left in the dataset
is not revealed. Computing the faster five-number summary on these records will
reveal this number whereas the oblivious version will keep it a secret. This choice
depends on the study as, in some cases, revealing the number of records is a de-
sired side effect.
We implemented the computation of one- and two-dimensional frequency ta-
bles. The computation of mean, variance, standard deviation, covariance, and dif-
ferent versions of the t-test became straightforward using the division and square
root functionality. We implemented all statistical tests according to the paradigm
where a test statistic is computed in the privacy-preserving setting and privately
compared to the critical test statistic that has been computed publicly, based on
the significance threshold determined by the analyst. This paradigm is described
by Option 2 of the private setting described in Chapter 2.
For the Wilcoxon rank sum and signed rank tests, the complex part was the
design of the privacy-preserving ranking function. This function sorts the values
and then gives ranks to each element based on their position in the sorted list. In
addition, the ranks of equal values are averaged. For the privacy-preserving rank
sum test, the ranking function works in the same way as in the standard setting,
but much slower, as there are many comparisons and, for equal values, the average
of the corresponding ranks has to be computed obliviously. We also designed a
version of the ranking function that does not deal with the equal values. However,
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this results in the test returning a stricter bound and some borderline cases might
be falsely depicted as belonging to H0.
The signed rank test uses a slightly different ranking function which does not
give ranks to values that are equal to 0. Fortunately, the elements to be ranked are
ordered based on absolute values, hence, the zero values are set at the beginning
of the sorted vector. This allows us to count the number of zeros in a privacy-
preserving manner and use this number as an offset for all the other ranks.
With the availability of division, the standard χ2 test became straightforward
to design and implement in the privacy-preserving setting. In addition, we now
have the possibility to include as many groups and classifications as are required
by the study, as opposed to the GWAS-specific solution. We did still implement
the optimised version for two cases as this is a bit faster.
5.3.2 Linear regression
Linear regression is currently one of the favourite tools of statistical analysts,
hence, we decided to design and implement some privacy-preserving algorithms
for this purpose. As the linear regression task can be recast to an ordinary system
of linear equations, we tried to find out what are the best general ways of solving
sets of linear equations. For sets with up to four variables, the fastest and most
accurate way is to simply invert the matrix by computing determinants. There are
two types of linear models—those with and those without the constant term. The
model without the constant term always predicts zero if all inputs are zero. The
model with the constant term has a nonzero additive offset c and, thus, predicts c if
all inputs are zero. The latter is more likely in a statistical setting and we account
for this bias by inserting an extra variable into the linear equation to denote this
offset.
We use simple inversion for sets of equations with up to four variables includ-
ing the offset. To deal with more variables, we looked into Gaussian elimination
with back substitution. We chose it because it is the most straightforward of the
algorithms and, because with a few modifications, this method can compute the
inverse matrix which can be useful in some future applications. As we had access
to the necessary integer and floating-point operations (addition, multiplication and
division), the algorithm was easily converted to the privacy-preserving setting.
The main difference between the standard and the privacy-preserving versions
of the algorithm is in finding the pivot element. As we need to exchange rows
based on the location of this element, this would be extremely slow if done obliv-
iously. Publishing the location of the pivot element will make the algorithm sig-
nificantly faster. The problem is that this leaks information about the location of
the largest element in the original matrix. To counter this leakage, we start the
algorithm by shuffling the linear equations as their order is not important. Now,
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the location of the pivot element does not reveal its location in the input matrix
any more.
We also designed a privacy-preserving version of LU decomposition, where
we again used row shuffling for reasons similar to the Gaussian elimination case.
We also needed to take out some optimisations that had been done for the standard
setting, as these relied on the data values which are difficult to access for our
algorithm. Namely, we rearrange a vector based on a given permutation instead
of addressing the vector in the permuted order during execution.
We also wanted to try solving a linear regression task using an iterative method.
We chose the conjugate gradient method as its initial convergence is rapid during a
small number of iterations. As we had access to matrix operations from the satel-
lite collision analysis application, this algorithm was also quite straightforward to
design for the privacy-preserving setting.
Iterative minimisation methods form a core of many machine learning meth-
ods. Thus, our privacy-preserving conjugate gradient method has applications in
machine learning as well. However, note that we implemented the conjugate gra-
dient method only for quadratic forms. Whereas, in the future, we can apply our
implementation in the context of support vector machines that reduce the clas-
sification problem to quadratic programming, our privacy-preserving conjugate
gradient method cannot be used for a general purpose.
We put all of the implemented functions together in a tool called RMIND that
resembles the R environment.
5.4 Impact of our work
Figure 5.1 depicts the privacy-preserving algorithms we created and implemented
for these papers using SECREC. The figure is based the on one from [8] but new
functionality from [9] has been added.
We collected all of this functionality and the matrix operations, and put to-
gether the RMIND tool. This tool is similar to the R environment and should,
therefore, be quite familiar to statistical analysts. The RMIND tool can be used to
perform privacy-preserving statistical analyses in the future. Detailed algorithms
for the statistical functions are available in the article [8]. From the most basic ma-
trix operations, the only thing missing is eigenvalue calculation for matrices with
arbitrary size. This can be implemented in the future using an iterative algorithm
if it is needed for an analysis.
At the moment, the RMIND tool is being prepared for a privacy-preserving
data analysis study that investigates whether the university drop-out rate in the
ICT field is correlated to students working during their studies. We discuss this
study in more detail in Chapter 6.
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Figure 5.1: Overview of operations implemented for the privacy-preserving statistical
analysis tool RMIND
55
CHAPTER 6
USING THE STATISTICS SUITE IN A
REAL-WORLD STUDY
6.1 Motivation
Having implemented the RMIND tool, the logical next step is to use it in practice.
Even though we provide benchmark results with the tool, these are done in a
laboratory setting, meaning that they only give an estimate of the performance.
Using the SHAREMIND platform and the RMIND tool on real data will enable us
to study the feasibility of privacy-preserving statistical studies in the real world.
First, the servers will be housed by three independent entities, with no local
area network connections between them. This will give us the possibility to mea-
sure performance in a real-world setting where different issues can interfere with
the work in progress. It also gives us insight into deploying the platform for differ-
ent parties with different information system and infrastructure setups. However,
the deployment issues will not be discussed in this dissertation, but in a separate
upcoming work.
Second, using real-world data in a study introduces new interesting problems
that we usually do not deal with when running tests. Real databases are seldom
perfect and can contain data that are either faulty, missing, or encoded based on
different rulesets. In the planned study, we will be working on the whole popu-
lation, hence, the size of the cohorts will be determined by the number of actual
records in the database. In addition, the different input parties will have to secret-
share the data themselves and upload them to the servers as the sensitive data
cannot leave the parties in the usual unencrypted format. Even though we will
provide the input parties with a tool that does this for them, there are some is-
sues that have to be dealt with. Namely, this requires that the data be described
in detail beforehand in terms of data types, whether we are dealing with classi-
fiers, whether values can be missing from a column, and most importantly, which
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columns are secret-shared and which are not.
Access to real personal data also entails various legal aspects. We want to
look into this as well, to see whether privacy-preserving statistical analysis using
secure multi-party computation is a notion that can be adequately explained to
parties without a thorough knowledge of cryptography. In addition, we want to
investigate what the theoretical and practical legal arrangements are that we need
to conduct such a study in the real world.
Third, the transformation of the data into an analysable format is something
that we have not tried before. In a laboratory setting, the test data tables are gene-
rated in the required format. With real data, however, the format is determined by
the source data. Moreover, we get data from different sources and we need to link
them together. It is very difficult to abstract this extract, transform, load (ETL)
process as it is very specific to the study and the data source. Therefore, a study
on real-world data can help us look into this issue.
And fourth, we want to give the RMIND tool to statistical analysts and ask
them to perform the analysis themselves. This will help us see what are the dif-
ferences between the studies in the privacy-preserving and the standard setting
based on where the analysts have trouble with their analysis. We will, of course,
help them with queries and instruct them when they require assistance, but we ask
them to work as they usually do on these kinds of studies.
All in all, we are not only solving an interesting statistical problem, we are
also piloting the platform and statistics tool in a large-scale privacy-preserving
statistical study on real data. We will help with the deployment of the platform
where necessary, but the system administrators of the respective parties will be
in charge of the actual process. During the study, we will also help with any
questions that can arise, but as regards to data, we will only have the role of one
of the computing parties and the technology provider. All other roles are filled by
entities that are independent from us, most of them government institutions.
6.2 Problem statement
To test the platform and statistics tool in practice, we will be investigating in-
formation and communication technology (ICT) education in Estonia. ICT is a
growing industry both in Estonia and the whole world. This kind of expansion
brings along a surge in the number of companies and start-ups that would like to
reap the benefit. For this, new personnel has to be employed. The Association
of Information Technology and Telecommunications (ITL1) in Estonia has stated
that they require 6000 ICT-specialists by year 2015 [32]. Estonia, however, is at
a slight disadvantage considering this requirement. With our small population of
1ITL homepage. http://www.itl.ee/
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around 1.3 million in January 2014 [59], and with our median wages being on
the lower side in Europe [33], we have to rely on educating more and more of our
students to fill this requirement, rather than expecting to make do with the existing
workforce or hoping to recruit from abroad.
There are several universities in Estonia and many of them teach different spe-
cialisations of ICT. In recent years, there has been a lot of publicity surrounding
this topic—universities are trying to recruit students by offering stipends and even
free laptops to help with studies. Regardless, the quota is often not met and not
all places are filled. What is worse, though, is the fact that a significant number of
students that do enrol, quit their studies before completion. By December 2012,
43% of ICT students who started their studies in 2006-2012 had quit without grad-
uating2.
For a small country trying to succeed in the ICT field, it is very important
to have highly skilled employees. Hence, it is paramount to try to find out why
so many students fail to graduate. Universities hypothesise that the high drop-
out rate is connected to students being hired as early as their first year and that
the students tend to favour their wages over a university degree. ITL consisting
of universities and ICT companies, and the government would like to find an
answer to whether the drop-out rate is higher for the students who work during
their studies or whether it has to do with the higher acceptance rate.
6.3 Background
There are two major ways of studying this problem. On one hand, it is possible
to make a survey and conduct interviews among the students who graduate and
those who do not. On the other hand, Estonia has government databases that
contain information about education and tax records. This allows the analysis to
include the whole population and work on objective data rather than interview
answers which can be somewhat biased as people might be ashamed or angry
because their studies have ended prematurely.
Naturally, the education and tax records databases are not linked. In fact,
the education database is managed by the Ministry of Education and Research,
and the tax records are held by the Tax and Customs Board operating under the
Ministry of Finance. To study the described problem, the two databases must be
joined and the data from both used in the analysis. Education records give us the
level and period of a person’s studies, tax records tell us whether a person has
been working in the ICT field during a given period of time. If these tables are
joined, we can determine whether there is a relation between working and quitting
2Data from the Ministry of Education, 2014
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studies. As we are not using a sample but the whole population, we can also use
simpler statistical analyses.
The data are available in two institutions that are under the jurisdiction of the
government. This should make it simple to carry out the study in the standard
setting. However, these two institutions have to adhere to the same laws as com-
panies do if a joint study is planned. The privacy issue, in this case, arises from the
Personal Data Protection Act that regulates the use of education data [65, §4-§6],
and the Taxation Act that regulates the use of tax data [64, §26-§30].
Needless to say that these data are useful in different analyses, but accessing
them is not an easy process. While the Ministry of Education and Research can
give data out for analysis under contracts with the analyst, the Tax and Customs
Board cannot. The latter usually pre-aggregates data into groups that can later be
used in analyses. This pre-aggregation is done in the following way. The analysts
get data from the Ministry of Education and select the groups they want to analyse,
such as all graduates from 2012 who graduated in nominal time. Other attributes
can be added to define these groups but the more attributes there are, the fewer
individuals will be included in the group. The Ministry of Education forwards the
identifiers of the people in each group to the Tax and Customs Board who then
outputs a list of desired attributes for each group.
This process requires there to be at least three people in one group. Unfor-
tunately, when we are dealing with students in a country with the population of
Estonia, the distinct groups are rather thin to begin with, especially in the PhD de-
gree section. Hence, many students can be left out of the study due to this filtering
process. Furthermore, the Tax Board also applies k-anonymity measures [70] to
each group, decreasing the number of results even further.
Secure multi-party computation has never been employed in any statistical
study involving the Tax Board and, therefore, the Tax Board has no previous posi-
tion on its usage. The legal aspects of using SMC to hide tax secrets are discussed
in Subsections 6.7.1 and 6.7.3.
6.4 The PRIST project
We started a project called PRIST (Private Statistics)3 that deals with studying the
described problem. Let us take a look at the parties in this analysis.
Figure 6.1 depicts the parties and the data flow in the privacy-preserving study
process of the PRIST project. The Ministry of Education and Research and the
Tax and Customs Board are the input parties in the study as they control the data
3Funded by the European Regional Development Fund from the sub-measure “Supporting the
development of the R&D of information and communication technology” through the Archimedes
Foundation.
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Figure 6.1: The PRIST project workflow
required for the analysis. The computing parties provide the servers that will
house the platform and where the computations will be performed.
The three computing parties are The Information System Authority that coor-
dinates the Estonian national information system, the IT department of the Min-
istry of Finance, and Cybernetica AS, a private company where the SHAREMIND
platform is developed. The code for SHAREMIND, the data importer, and the
statistical analysis tool RMIND will be reviewed by the IT department of the Min-
istry of Finance. The result party is the Estonian Center for Applied Research
(CentAR), who will perform the statistical analysis on RMIND and publish the
results as a report. This setting corresponds to the last deployment model in Ta-
ble 2.2 from Section 2.2.
The Association of Information Technology and Telecommunications (ITL) is
an organisation that unites Estonian information technology and telecommunica-
tions companies and universities, encouraging their co-operation and representing
their interests. ITL is the customer in our study as their members receive com-
plaints from the universities related to the early hiring of students. Their interest
is to find out whether the hypotheses set by the universities have a basis to them
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and whether they should start discouraging their members from hiring people still
in their first years of university studies.
First, the input parties (Tax and Customs Board and Ministry of Education and
Research) export the data agreed to be used in the study from their databases in
comma separated value (CSV) format. Next, they insert these data into the CSV
importer tool. This tool takes the data and a pre-defined data model, secret-shares
the data into three parts and uploads each part into a separate remote database
based on the data model. It is important to note, that the data are secret-shared at
the input party side so the values do not leave these parties unencrypted. Each of
the computing parties (IT department of the Ministry of Finance, the Informations
System Authority, Cybernetica AS) only gets their share of each value.
Now that the data have been uploaded, the result party (CentAR) can start
querying. With this type of directed study where we have already posed the study
question that we ultimately want an answer to, the exploration of data is secondary
and only needed for quality control. In this setting, the statistician does not need
to see the data in order to choose analysis methods, as only the relevant attributes
have been uploaded into the database. The statistical analyst uses the RMIND tool
to make the necessary queries. The queries are sent to all the computing parties
who then perform the analysis in a privacy-preserving manner. When they finish
a task, test or algorithm, they get only the shares of the result, not the result itself.
The shares are then returned to the result party where the RMIND tool declassifies
and publishes the result to the analyst.
The statistical analyst puts together a report detailing the results received from
the queries. As the RMIND tool can also return plots, the statistical analyst does
not need to use another tool for visualising the results. When the report is com-
piled, the analyst can send it to the customer (ITL).
6.5 Data import and pre-processing
Let us look at the statistical study part of the process in more detail. The data
will be imported as two separate sets—the education information of students who
finished or started their studies between 2006 and 2012, and their income from
2004 to 2013 to also evaluate the potential salary prior to studies. To get these two
datasets into analysable format, they are extracted from their original structures,
transformed into a format that is suitable for the study and loaded for analysis.
This is known as the extract, transform, load (ETL) process. The main reason for
carrying out this process is that real world data are rarely collected and stored in
a format that is ideal or even suitable for analysis. Figure 6.2 shows the privacy-
preserving ETL process for the PRIST project. The process prepares the input
data from the Ministry of Education and the Tax Board as an analysis table that
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can be used for computing the necessary statistics.
The ETL process can be roughly divided into three subtasks which will all be
carried out in a privacy-preserving manner on secret-shared data. First, we want
to extract the education data and transform them into a format where each row
corresponds to one person’s studies in one curriculum. Second, we want to extract
the salary data and transform them into a format where each row corresponds to
one person’s salary information for all 10 years. And third, we want to join the
two tables and transform the obtained table into the analysable format required by
the statistical analysts. This analysis table has three types of attributes.
• Fixed attributes, such as ID or whether a person was working in an ICT
company during their studies.
• Attributes ranging over years of study, such as whether a person was work-
ing during study year i.
• Attributes ranging over years after graduation, such as whether a person
was working during year j after graduation.
The statistical analysts looked at the data descriptions of the two data sources
and, based on these, provided us with the format for the table on which they will
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perform their analyses. As they mean to use mainly filtering and summation as
their tools, the privacy-preserving ETL process is expected to transform the data
into a suitable format. The process will be carried out entirely in the RMIND
tool using its query language. In this pilot study, we designed the ETL process
ourselves based on the resulting dataset description given to us by the statistical
analysts to see whether there were missing operations from the SHAREMIND sys-
tem. We store the process as a set of RMIND queries that can later be run by the
result party on real data.
Aggregation of the separate data tables can be performed in the public setting
to speed up the process. However, this requires that the input parties transform the
data into the format that the analysts need instead of outputting data in the format
that their databases provide. We want to avoid giving additional tasks to the input
parties as we want the process to be as close to the standard setting as possible.
Another possibility for public aggregation is to have the importer tool perform
these tasks. We do not view this as a good option either, as we want the importer
tool to be universal for all input parties. Moreover, if these aggregations are done
before data sharing and import, we cannot later query more detailed data without
a new data import stage, should the study plan change. Therefore, we carry out
the aggregation process in the secure multi-party setting.
6.5.1 Privacy-preserving aggregation
To transform the data tables into the necessary format, we need a privacy-preserving
aggregation operation. Aggregation is a standard database operation that groups
items based on a chosen attribute the values of which are equal in all rows within
the group. Then an aggregation function is applied to the columns in each group
and, as a result, we receive a dataset with one aggregated row for each group.
Consider the example in Figure 6.3. Here, the table is aggregated based on
the attributes ID and Year and the rows in the resulting dataset are computed
using the following aggregation functions on values of each group: random(ID),
random(Year), avg(Salary), random(Education).
More formally, let A = as,t be a dataset with m attributes and N records,
s ∈ {1, . . . , N} and t ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. We denote rows of this dataset as as. Let
C ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} be the set containing the indices of the columns by which the
rows in the table will be grouped. Then {X1, . . . ,Xn} is a set of n matrices
(1 ≤ n ≤ N) with m columns where each matrix X is composed of rows ag
such that for each c ∈ C, the elements of attribute c are equal in all rows.
Let j ∈ {1, . . . , v} , 1 ≤ v and let b be a tuple of indices of attributes, such
that bj ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. In addition, let op be a tuple of identifiers of aggregation
operations so that opj ∈ {first,max,min, sum, avg, count}. Let qi be the number
of rows in the grouped matrix Xi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
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ID Year Month Salary Education
1 2006 1 1000 4
1 2006 2 2000 4
1 2007 1 2000 4
2 2007 1 1000 3
2 2007 2 1000 3
group by ID and year
ID Year Salary Education
1 2006 1500 4
1 2007 2000 4
2 2007 1000 3
Figure 6.3: Example of aggregation: Group by (ID, Year), select (random(ID),
random(Year), avg(Salary), random(Education))
The aggregated dataset D = di,bj has v columns and n rows, so that
D = {di,bj |opj(yj), yj = (xg,bj ), xg,bj ∈ Xi, g ∈ {1, . . . , qi}}.
Note that the input identifiers of attributes b1, . . . , bv can have recurring elements,
as the analyst might need to perform several operations on elements of one at-
tribute. The possible aggregation operations op are the following:
• random - taking the first available element, as all elements are assumed to
be equal (equality will not be checked),
• max - taking the maximal element (this also serves as the disjunction oper-
ation for Booleans),
• min - taking the minimal element (this also serves as the conjunction oper-
ation for Booleans),
• sum - summing the elements,
• avg - computing the average of elements,
• count - counting the available elements.
Algorithm 3 describes the privacy-preserving aggregation procedure. This
algorithm works similarly to the join operation discussed in [54].
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Algorithm 3: Privacy-preserving aggregation procedure
Data: Dataset [[A]] with m attributes and N records, indices of attributes
C ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} by which to group the dataset, tuple of indices
(b1, . . . , bv), bi ∈ {1, . . . ,m} , (1 ≤ v) of attributes that will be
included in the resulting dataset, tuple of identifiers (op1, . . . , opv)
of aggregation operations
Result: Dataset [[D]] with v attributes and n records (1 ≤ n ≤ N)
1 Obliviously shuffle rows of [[A]]
2 Combine the values of attributes c ∈ C into composite keys [[k1]], . . . , [[kN ]]
3 Use oblivious AES to encrypt the composite keys, denote them as
[[k′1]], . . . , [[k′N ]]
4 (k′1, . . . , k′N )← declassify([[k′1]], . . . , [[k′N ]])
5 Let n be the number of unique groups in (k′1, . . . , k′N )
6 for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
7 for j ∈ {1, . . . , v} do
8 Obliviously apply operation opj to elements of attribute bj within
group i
9 end
10 Write the result into [[D]]
11 end
12 return [[D]]
This algorithm leaks the number of groups and the number of elements in each
group. The former is a desired result. As for the latter, we use shuffle at the begin-
ning of the algorithm so the number of elements in each group cannot be linked
to the original dataset. There is a possibility of performing aggregation without
leaking the number of elements in each group. This can be done by obliviously
adding dummy elements into the set to compensate for the groups that have fewer
elements. For details, see the size unification protocol from article [54] where the
same idea is discussed for the join operation.
6.5.2 Education dataset
The Ministry of Education and Research imports values for the following at-
tributes: person ID, gender, year of birth, year of observation, level of study
(Bachelor’s, Master’s, PhD, professional higher education), curriculum, length
of nominal period of curriculum, school, date of admission, status of studies (in
progress, quit, graduated), date of graduation/termination.
This dataset is too detailed for our needs. We want the data to be in the format
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where each row corresponds to one person’s studies in one curriculum. However,
the records originally have the following structure.
1. One record for each person’s each study position for each year from 2006
to 2012.
2. One record for the enrolment of a person in a study position prior to 2006.
We need to aggregate the records based on unique people. We also need to
keep separate records for a person’s studies in different curricula, so the unique
identifier in this case will be the person ID combined with the curriculum ID. This
is depicted as Aggregation 1 in Figure 6.2. We use the aggregation procedure
from Algorithm 3 to group the different records with the same unique identifier
together. The year of observation becomes obsolete during this aggregation and
will be left out of the resulting dataset.
The date of admission will be renamed as date of first admission to account
for students who have started in the same curriculum several times. The minimum
of the values will be selected as the date of first admission. The date of gradua-
tion/termination will similarly be taken as the maximum of the available values
to obtain the latest of these dates. The status of studies is the trickiest of the at-
tributes. There are four options—in progress, quit, graduated, in progress at the
end of 2012—and the logic is the following.
1. The resulting status can never be “in progress”.
2. The resulting status can only be “quit”, if the person never graduated from
the curriculum in question not even after several tries.
3. The resulting status is “graduated”, if the person graduated from the cur-
riculum in question. A person is not allowed to reapply for a curriculum
they have graduated from.
4. The resulting status is “in progress 2012” if the person’s studies were still
ongoing by the end of 2012.
If we give these options codes 1 for in progress, 2 for quit, 3 for graduated, and 4
for in progress 2012, we can take the maximum of these values as the result.
The original dataset does not have the fourth option. In fact we only need this
for one special case in which a person has quit their studies in a curriculum, then
re-enrolled, and is still studying at the end of the period under analysis (i.e, at the
end of 2012). In such a case, the status after aggregation must be “in progress”
instead of “quit”, which the maximum operation would return without the added
fourth option. We add this option by obliviously changing the values that are “in
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progress” in 2012 to “in progress 2012”. Now taking the maximal element in a
group will always return the right code.
Note that, during data import, codes are given to classifier values automati-
cally, based on their order of appearance. Hence, an imported dataset might not
immediately have the classifier options we require. For this purpose, we allow the
users to obliviously recode the classifier values by providing the codes they wish
the options to have. Hence, regardless of the codes that the classifier denoting the
status of studies originally has, we can reorder them so that, during aggregation,
the maximal element can be chosen.
All other values are the same within a group based on a person’s ID and the
curriculum ID, hence, a random element is taken from the values of each of these
attributes. Having done this, we have obtained our desired table format.
6.5.3 Tax dataset
The Tax and Customs Board inputs data with the following attributes: person
ID, year, month, payment for which social security has been charged, dividend
income, income from self-employment, whether the employer was from the ICT
field, whether the employer was a member of ITL.
Similarly to the education dataset, the tax dataset is too detailed for our needs.
Specifically, there is a record for each source of income per month per person.
This means that if a person gets a salary from two companies for a year, there
are 24 records in the table for that person that year. For our study, we only need
information about the average salary per year and the number of months that a
person worked during a year. In fact, our end-goal is to receive a table where each
row corresponds to one person’s salary information for all 10 years.
As the first step, we will add some new attributes to the dataset based on the
existing data. Namely, we add attributes whether the person received income from
self-employment and whether the person received dividend income. These at-
tributes will generalise some of the more detailed attributes in the original dataset.
Second, we want to combine a person’s salaries during one month for the
cases where a person is holding multiple jobs (Aggregation 2 in Figure 6.2). For
this, we group the data by person ID, year and month, and calculate the sum of
the payment attributes within a group. During this operation, we leave out the
detailed attributes (dividend income, income from self-employment) and take the
maximum of the corresponding generalised attributes.
Next, we average the monthly income into average income per year (Aggre-
gation 3 in Figure 6.2). We do this per month of employment, meaning that if a
person worked for one month, their average yearly income will be that month’s
salary. For this, we group the dataset by person ID and year. We compute the
average income and count the records in each group to get the number of months
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that the person worked during that year. In addition, we take the maximal element
for the Boolean attributes (is ICT, is ITL, was self-employed, received dividend
income) again.
Now, we expand the table adding an attribute for each year for all the at-
tributes: income, number of months, is an ICT company, is not an ICT company,
is an ITL company, received income from self-employment, received dividend in-
come. Our table will have 7 · 10 = 70 new columns. Let us look at an example
record for person X for year 2006. This record will have all the attributes for that
person during that year. After expansion, the record will have 70 new columns.
To fill these columns we do the following.
1. We obliviously build a mask vector for each record based on its year a ∈
{2004, . . . , 2013}. In our example the mask vector is built by comparing
2006 to all possible years, so the resulting mask vector is (0, 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0).
2. For each of the attributes we expanded, we multiply the corresponding at-
tribute with the mask vector and save the result as the corresponding ex-
panded attribute. In our example this means that the original average salary
s for person X is saved as (0, 0, s, 0, . . . , 0).
The result is a fairly sparse table containing one record per person per year.
The final step is to group by person ID (Aggregation 4 in Figure 6.2) to receive
an expanded table that has one record per person which includes the data for all
the years in question. Hence, we use sum as the operation for all of the grouped
attributes. This works for the Boolean attributes as well, as within a group, each
column has exactly one value. Finally, we have achieved the desired table format.
6.5.4 Obtaining the analysis table
Now we combine our two tables—education and salary information—into one
data table using left join, so that people with no salary information will also be
retained in the resulting database. We apply the privacy-preserving join procedure
described in [54].
For performing the statistical analysis, we require the salary information to
be relative to the person’s studies, meaning that we would like the salaries to
correspond to the study years i. Hence, we will convert the data so that, for each
student, there will be an attribute for work and salary information for each year i
of their studies beginning with admission. As an example consider a person who
started her studies in 2007. For this student, the salary information in the attribute
salary1 will be information from 2007. For another student, starting in 2010, the
same attribute salary1 will contain salary information from 2010. The resulting
table will be relatively sparse.
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For this, we need the possibility to shift vector elements. The shifting function
is relatively study-specific. Oblivious vector shifting means that elements in the
vector are shifted left by a number of spaces k, where k is a private value. The
k-th element and all those to the left of it are copied to the end of the vector and
are marked as not available in the corresponding availability vector.
Using this function, we add attributes for all the years i since admission for
the following information:
• Whether the person was working during year i;
• Whether the person was working and studying during year i; whether they
were working for at least 3, 6, and 9 months during year i;
• Exactly how many months the person was working during year i;
• Salary during studies during year i; salary if they were working for at least
3, 6, and 9 months during studies in year i;
• Whether the person was working in an ICT company during the nominal
period during year i;
• Whether the person was working in a non-ICT company during the nominal
period during year i;
• Whether the person was working in an ITL company during the nominal
period during year i.
We also create another shift to reflect working during years j after graduation
with the following attributes:
• Whether the person was working during year j after graduation, whether
they were working for at least 3, 6, and 9 months during year j;
• Salary during year j after graduation; salary if they were working for at
least 3, 6, and 9 months during year j after graduation.
Unfortunately, oblivious shifting requires us to align the dataset with the per-
son whose studies have been the longest, i.e., if the earliest admission date is from
1994, we will have to make columns for study years 1 through 20 for everyone.
This will make the data matrix extremely sparse because most of the studies will
be within 2 to 6 years. In addition, we do not have salary information before 2004,
so the extreme cases can only be used to analyse graduation in expected time for
different fields.
We create this sparse data matrix because later it will be easier to formulate
the necessary analysis queries. Recall, that we have the salary data as a vector
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of 10 values for years 2004-2013. We need to obliviously shift this salary vector
according to each person’s individual year of admission. As there are 10 elements
in the salary vector, but we might have more that 10 years of study, we also add a
padding of zeros before the shifting process. The shift will essentially select the
first element from the salary info of the year of admission and add all the previous
salary data to the end of the vector, changing the corresponding last elements as
not available.
To obtain the necessary attributes, the shift based on years since admission
will range from one to 2013−min(year of admission)+1. For the shift reflecting
working after graduation we need a shorter period of time, as we know that the
earliest graduation information we have is from 2006. Hence, we shorten the
salary vector to include only years 2007 to 2013 and shift this, instead, based on
the year of the end of studies plus one. The index for this shift will range from
one to seven.
We generalise some of the attributes that are more detailed in the joined data
table. Namely, based on the year of graduation, we make attributes for divi-
dend income before and after graduation, and do the same for income from self-
employment. We also find out whether the person was working in an ICT com-
pany during their studies. The resulting analysis table will be used for performing
the statistical queries.
6.6 Statistical analysis
When we have compiled the analysis database, the statistical analyst at CentAR
can perform the necessary queries using the RMIND tool.
In Estonia, there are four major schools that teach ICT subjects: University
of Tartu, Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn University and Estonian In-
formation Technology College. In the following, the statistics done across all
schools refer to these four institutions. First, descriptive statistics for the dataset
are computed using the following queries on the education database:
• Number of students starting ICT studies across all schools in different levels
of study during the years 2006-2012 (1 query);
• Number of students graduating from ICT studies across all schools in dif-
ferent levels of study during the years 2006-2012 (1 query);
• Number of students quitting their ICT studies across all schools in different
levels of study during the years 2006-2012 (1 query);
• Percentage of students graduating their Bachelor’s studies in nominal time
based on year of admission during the years 2006-2009 in ICT and non-
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ICT fields. The same for professional higher education studies and Master’s
studies; the same queries for graduation of ICT in nominal time across dif-
ferent universities (6 queries).
To study general employment during studies, the following queries are per-
formed on the analysis database:
• Percentage of working students based on year of admission during the three
years of Bachelor’s studies in ICT and non-ICT fields; the same for pro-
fessional higher education studies and Master’s studies; the same queries
based on working during studies in ICT across the schools (6 queries);
• Number of months worked during a calendar year during nominal study
time during the three years of Bachelor’s studies in ICT; the same for pro-
fessional higher education studies and Master’s studies (3 queries).
To study employment in ICT companies and ITL member companies during
studies, the following queries are performed on the analysis database:
• Percentage of students working in ICT companies based on year of ad-
mission during the years of Bachelor’s studies in ICT and non-ICT fields;
the same query for professional education studies and Master’s studies; the
same queries for ITL member companies (6 queries);
• Percentage of students working in ICT companies based on year of admis-
sion during the three years of Bachelor’s studies in ICT across three uni-
versities; the same for professional higher education studies and Master’s
studies; the same queries for ITL member companies (6 queries).
To study employment after graduation or quitting studies, the following queries
are performed on the analysis database:
• Rate of employment after graduation or quitting studies in ICT and non-
ICT fields one to three years after graduating/quitting Bachelor’s studies;
the same for professional higher education studies and Master’s studies; the
same queries based on ICT studies across the schools (6 queries).
To study income during studies, the following queries are performed on the
analysis database:
• Median monthly income of ICT and non-ICT students during Bachelor’s
studies based on year of admission and the fact of graduation/quitting; the
same for professional higher education studies and Master’s studies; the
same queries for ICT students across schools (6 queries);
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• Median monthly income of ICT students across schools during the nomi-
nal time Bachelor’s studies based on year of study and the fact of gradua-
tion/quitting; the same for professional higher education studies and Mas-
ter’s studies (3 queries).
To study income after graduation or quitting studies, the following queries are
performed on the analysis database:
• Median monthly income of ICT and non-ICT students after graduating or
quitting Bachelor’s studies one to three years after graduating/quitting; the
same for professional higher education studies; the same queries for ICT
students across schools (4 queries).
In the queries about median salary, boxplots can be used to also show variation
of the salaries in each group. In addition, we can perform the Wilcoxon rank sum
test to find out whether the difference in medians in both groups is significant or
not.
To validate the results of the study, a study will be conducted on the data in the
standard setting. CentAR has signed confidentiality agreements with the Ministry
of Education and Research and the Tax Board. However, as tax data are very
sensitive, the confidentiality agreement only allows access to anonymised and pre-
aggregated data from the Tax Board. CentAR will perform the same queries on
the non-encrypted data. As a side-result, we can get an idea of how many students
the pre-aggregation process will leave out of the study due to their uniqueness
and how much this influences the results of the study. This information can be
valuable in justifying the use of secure computations.
6.7 Preparing for the study
6.7.1 Achieving compliance with data protection
The study is carried out by our project team. In this section, “we” refers to mem-
bers of the team. The author of this work is responsible for creating the plan of
the study in the privacy-preserving setting and designing the ETL process. Addi-
tionally, she has contributed to the management of the project.
As is the case with the real world, things rarely go as planned on paper months
and even years in advance. When the project got its approval and financing, and
was started on February 15, 2013, the first thing was to go to the Ministry of Edu-
cation and Research and the Tax Board, to acquaint them with the notion of secure
multi-party computation and its possibilities. Our team also met with the project
managers from the IT department of the Ministry of Finance and the Estonian In-
formation System Authority to talk about the possibility of housing the computing
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servers with the secret-shared data. The computing parties expressed readiness to
host the servers if we give them instructions for deployment. In September 2013,
our team went to the input parties and asked if they were willing to share their data
using our importer tool. The Ministry of Education and Research was prepared to
export the data, but the Tax Board requested that we ask for an approval from the
Data Protection Inspectorate to export the data even in privacy-preserving format.
We prepared a request for the Data Protection Inspectorate about the project
and submitted it in November 2013. Members of our team also visited the inspec-
torate and explained what secure multi-party computation is and how the statisti-
cal analysis is conducted on secret-shared data. We explained that these data can
be considered to be encrypted and that single values will not be accessible by any
party. The Data Protection Inspectorate reviewed our proposal and, in January
2014, we received their decision that according to subsection 16 (1) of the Per-
sonal Data Protection Act, personal data can be used in scientific research only
in coded form and, in such a case, no further permission is needed from the Data
Protection Agency. Basically, they accepted secret-shared data as encrypted data
and issued a statement that their permission need not be asked for this kind of
study if we conduct it with the described security controls [26].
The response from the Data Protection Agency assured the Tax Board that the
terms of the Data Protection Act will not be compromised. However, as mentioned
before, access to tax information is also regulated by the tax secrecy clauses in
the Taxation Act. Therefore, in April 2014, the Tax Board expressed interest
in receiving the statistical analysis tool to see, what kind of analysis results the
statistician will have access to.
Following this, we redesigned the study process so that before the real data
are imported, the Compliance Department of the Tax Board can perform a test run
using RMIND on generated data to evaluate the privacy-preservation capabilities
of the platform and the statistical tool.
6.7.2 Improving the tool to handle real-world data
In June 2014, we finished the statistics tool RMIND, adding the functionality nec-
essary for the project. CentAR then went on to request different comparative plots
and the possibility to paste together plots from analyses on different filters. We
added these features in July. In August, we finished improving the logging system
and prepared the code for review by the IT department of the Ministry of Finance.
We also made the platform more stable for the case where one of the computing
parties loses connection.
In August, we also got the sample data created by CentAR. We had received
sample files from them before, but those had already been cleaned for the study.
This new information left us with three new interesting obstacles.
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First, it turned out that the datasets included dates. A usual database engine
can accept dates without a problem. We can also use similar methods (e.g., Unix
timestamps) to save dates, however, we had never needed these values in practice,
so, naturally, this functionality had not been implemented. We decided on the
format and implemented date importing as well.
Second, the classifier values (e.g., school, degree) were a combination of
codes and names instead of simply a code. For secure multi-party computa-
tion, this is a problem. While we are technically capable of storing secret-share
strings, it is significantly more time-consuming to perform comparison operations
on them. Hence, we decided to change the importer so that it filters out all of
the available values and prepares a classifier from them. The codes of this classi-
fier will be stored in a secret-shared format, whereas the corresponding classifier
values will be public. Making the classifier values public is not a problem, as
they are freely available from the web page of Statistics Estonia. With this ap-
proach, we leak the information about which of the classifier values are present
(and, therefore, missing) in the dataset.
This gives us practical information that is usually desired in a statistical study
and, if it is not desired information, we have to give the importer tool the whole
classifier set and ask it to encode the classifiers based on that. A worse option is
that if only one value is present, we will know this value for all imported records.
However, this is a problem with smaller data sizes, as with the whole population,
such an attribute carries no real information if it is the same for every person in
the population. This can also be countered by using the original classifier for data
import.
This approach to encoding classifiers also leaks the order in which new ele-
ments appear. This, in turn, reveals, what the value is for the first record. This can
be countered by the importer tool that shuffles either the input data or the classi-
fiers. It is more feasible to shuffle the classifiers, as there is bound to be less of
them.
Third, the recorded classifiers turn out, in fact, to be too detailed for our study.
We wish to take all the available education levels and convert them into groups
of applied science degree, bachelor’s degree, master’s degree, and PhD degree.
There are three implicit ways of doing this—we can ask the input parties to group
the classifier values for us, we can convert them on the fly in the importer tool, or
we can import the detailed information and then perform the aggregation in the
secret-shared database.
As we do not want the input parties to do extra work, we set aside the first
option. Converting the values in the importer tool on the fly would require us to
be familiar with all the possible input data values as we would already need to
ship the conversion rules along with the importer. As with real-life databases, it
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is often the case that there are mistakes and typos in them, and data have often
been collected using different versions of classifiers, we would have to fix the
importer, redeploy it and ask the input party to run the process again. This will
again inconvenience the input parties as they might have to perform the same task
several times.
Hence, we will choose the third option, importing the data as-is, and then
converting the classifiers already in the secret-shared database. There are several
advantages to this approach. First, if there are indeed typos or mistakes in the clas-
sifiers, we will have the entire list of available values and we can distribute these
into the necessary groups using human intelligence where necessary. Second, we
have the original classifier values and if the conversion requirements change, we
can rerun the conversion query and have the values we need. All of this can be
done without requiring direct action from the input parties, making it easier to
carry out the changes as their deployment will not require a lot of resources. This
kind of conversion can easily be carried out on secret-shared data. As we are deal-
ing with millions of records, the process will take time. However, as this process
needs to be carried out only once and the results will be saved, this can be done
separately from the statistical analysis.
The ETL process was quite difficult to come up with in the privacy-preserving
setting. We were given the attributes that the analysts expected to be working on.
They also gave us their own ETL scripts, but as the data format is so different in the
two settings, it would be highly infeasible to run the same scripts on secret shared
data. With some thinking, though, we were able to come up with quite an elegant
solution also for the privacy-preserving ETL process. However, at the moment,
this solution is quite study-specific and it is difficult to generalise and apply it to
other studies. Creating a set of ETL tools for future use is an interesting topic we
want to look into. The aggregation procedure that was designed and implemented,
as well as the vector element shifting are two components that will be available in
RMIND should they be needed in future ETL processes.
6.7.3 Code review and acceptance testing by the Tax Board
We delivered the source code of SHAREMIND and RMIND to the IT department
of the Ministry of Finance in November 2014. They reviewed the source code
and concluded that both the platform and the statistical tool are professional and
skilfully built. However, they also admitted that they lack the detailed knowledge
to verify all the security claims of the system.
In December 2014, we held a testing session with the specialists working in
the Compliance Department of the Tax Board. We explained the cryptographic
privacy guarantees given by SHAREMIND and described how the study plan is
technologically enforced. Finally, we demonstrated the privacy-preservation tools
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Dataset Education records Tax records
A 350 records 8200 records
B 831 000 records 16 million records
Figure 6.4: Data sizes in the test datasets
in practice by running various queries on generated data to show how RMIND
ensures output privacy.
The demonstration was successful and in January 2015, the Tax Board agreed
to provide data for the privacy-preserving study. All input parties, computing
parties and result parties signed legal agreements to fix their obligations to each
other within the security model of the SHAREMIND system. The parties agreed to
host the secure multi-party computation system in good faith and without trying to
tamper with its processing, hence, complying with the semi-honest security model
of the underlying protocols.
6.7.4 Performance measurements
We generated two sensible and coherent test datasets to test the accuracy and
performance of our solution. Test set A is smaller and used for correctness testing,
test set B is used for evaluating performance and its size is similar to that of real
input data. Table 6.4 gives the data sizes in these two datasets. We asked our
colleagues in CentAR to run queries on the generated data using STATA to see
how long the ETL process and analysis take in the usual setting. We also asked
them to provide us with results to the queries done on the smaller database so we
could compare them to the results we got using the privacy-preserving tool.
We concluded our preparations for the study by measuring the performance of
the privacy-preserving extract, transform, load process. We measured the perfor-
mance of the RMIND scripts that perform data aggregations and transformations
needed to construct the final analysis database. We ran the benchmark in a labo-
ratory setting with three separate machines connected with 1 Gbit network links.
Each server has two 2,93 GHz CPUs with 6 cores each and 8 GB of RAM per
core to a total of 48 GB.
Table 6.5 contains the descriptions and running times of the five individual
RMIND scripts. The work is divided between scripts based on the ETL process
diagram given in Figure 6.2. The RMIND tool performs all operations in each
script in succession. The performance was measured on the RMIND client side.
In the table, Time A and Time B show the running times for the generated datasets
A and B, respectively.
The total running time of about two and a half days for the whole extract,
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Script Description Time A Time B
1 Aggregation of education data 1 min 3 s 25 min
Aggregation of tax data
2 (monthly income) 46 s 18 h 10 min
Aggregation of tax data
3 (average yearly income) 4 min 34 s 1 h 55 min
Aggregation of tax data
4 and joining the two datasets 32 s 32 min
5 Compiling the analysis table (shifting) 6 min 7 s 39 h 3 min
Sum 13 min 2 s 60 h 5 min
Figure 6.5: Running times of the privacy-preserving ETL scripts in test datasets A and B
transform, load step is not excessively high in this study, but may sound discour-
aging for wider applications. However, we stress that this is the first time a sta-
tistical study of this complexity has ever been performed on secure multi-party
computation.
We expect that further research into the protocols and algorithms, as well as
engineering efforts towards better virtual machines and compilers, will certainly
reduce the running time of the study. Thus, we remain optimistic of the future of
the technology and continue our efforts in increasing its efficiency.
6.8 Impact of our work
The work done within this dissertation has prepared the algorithms and tools
needed for the described statistical study. The study itself is scheduled to be con-
ducted in the first half of 2015.
This is the first study of this magnitude that will be carried out in a privacy-
preserving setting based on secure multi-party computation. The data will be
imported from existing real-world databases. It is also the first practical study
where data from two different sources will be merged for joint data analysis, will
be extracted, transformed and loaded into a unified analysis table in a privacy-
preserving setting, and will be analysed in a privacy-preserving manner.
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CONCLUSION
Data are gathered in many fields of life. The purpose of this process is either data
archival or, more often, data analysis to find interesting information or patterns to
support decision making. However, the most interesting kind of data contains in-
formation about people or organisations. Analysing this sensitive information has
restrictions, most of which are governed by national or international legislation.
These laws do not forbid data analysis if certain protective measures are taken.
These include organisational measures, e.g., confidentiality agreements, or techni-
cal measures, e.g., pseudonymisation or pre-aggregation of data. These are meant
to either prevent data analysts from identifying single subjects in a cohort in the
case of technical measures, or simply having them promise not search for the
information or disclose any confidential results in the case of organisational mea-
sures.
This dissertation investigates the possibility of using secure multi-party com-
putation technology to perform statistical analyses in a privacy-preserving setting.
We look at this problem from two perspectives. Firstly, we show that it is possible
to implement statistical analysis algorithms in the privacy-preserving multi-party
setting, and secondly, that the implemented solution is feasible enough for practi-
cal use.
The main result of this dissertation is the privacy-preserving statistical analy-
sis tool RMIND that contains the most commonly used statistical operations, such
as descriptive statistics, simple statistical measures, statistical tests for comparing
two populations, and linear regression. To support the creation of this tool, we
designed and implemented privacy-preserving floating-point arithmetic as part of
this dissertation for the secure multi-party computation platform SHAREMIND and
the arithmetic has been incorporated as a standard component of the platform.
RMIND provides an R-like environment that is based on the SHAREMIND plat-
form and that can be used by statistical analysts who need not know the details of
the cryptography that lies beneath the surface. This is a similar concept to how
analysts do not have to know the details of the more complicated statistical tests
they are running. The RMIND tool can be used with little instruction as we have
aimed at making it very similar to the existing tools and all the secure multi-party
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computation details are hidden from the user.
We will validate the usability of the RMIND tool by carrying out a nation-wide
statistical study in a privacy-preserving manner about the influence of working
during university studies. The data will be acquired from the Ministry of Edu-
cation and the Tax Board of Estonia and the analyses will be performed using
the privacy-preserving algorithms described in this dissertation. We show how
the extract, transform, load process for such a study can be done in the privacy-
preserving setting. This process turns out to be the most complicated part of
privacy-preserving statistical analysis, as we cannot perform all queries in the
same manner as in the standard setting. We offer a solution for the planned statis-
tical study, but we leave a more generalised approach as future work.
All of the algorithms presented in this dissertation return results that are secret-
shared. However, for a statistical analysis, results need to be declassified. Ana-
lysing how much data is leaked during this process and how to mitigate this leak-
age using query auditing and differential privacy results remains an interesting
topic for future research.
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KOKKUVÕTE
(SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN)
TURVALISEL ÜHISARVUTUSEL
PÕHINEV PRIVAATSUST SÄILITAV
STATISTILINE ANALÜÜS
Tundlike isikuandmete analüüs on probleem, mida ettevõtted ja valitsused päevast-
päeva lahendada püüavad. Teadlased on uurinud ja kasutusele võtnud erinevaid
statistilisi meetmeid, et vähendada isikuandmete leket. Veelgi levinum on konfi-
dentsiaalsuslepete kasutamine. Selle asemel, et kasutada tõestatult turvalisi mee-
todeid, edastatakse andmed analüütikutele, kes viivad läbi statistilisi uuringuid
tundlike andmete peal.
Turvaline ühisarvutus on vahend, mille abil on võimalik andmeid jagada ja
töödelda privaatsust säilitavalt nii, et isegi andmeanalüütik ei näe üksikuid väär-
tusi. Need krüptograafilised protokollid on olnud teadlaste huviorbiidil alates sel-
lest ajast, kui Yao tutvustas 1980ndatel oma ideid loogikaskeemide sogastamise
kohta. Krüptograafid on loonud ka praktilisi rakendusi, mis kasutavad erinevaid
turvalise ühisarvutuse protokolle. Need rakendused kasutavad Boole’i algebrat ja
täisarvuaritmeetikat selleks, et pakkuda lahendusi erinevatele probleemidele, kaa-
saarvatud statistilisele analüüsile. Kahjuks kasutavad need eraldiseisvad funkt-
sioonid väga erinevaid alusprotokolle ja on seetõttu piiratud käsitlusalaga ning
neid on raske koos kasutada.
Käesolev dissertatsioon kirjeldab protokollistikku, mille abil on võimalik viia
läbi statistilisi uuringuid privaatsust säilitavas keskkonnas turvalise ühisarvutuse
platvormi SHAREMIND [6] abil. Töö autor kavandas kõik töös kirjeldatud algo-
ritmid ning lõi nende jaoks vajalikud eeltingimused kavandades ja realiseerides
ujukomaaritmeetika. Samuti panustas autor töö käigus kavandatud statistikaalgo-
ritmide realiseerimisse. Loodud algoritmid ei sõltu alusplatvormist ning neid on
90
seetõttu võimalik kasutada ka teistes turvalise arvutuse süsteemides, mis toeta-
vad privaatsust säilitavat täisarvu- ja ujukomaaritmeetikat, sorteerimist, andmete
juhuslikku ümberjärjestamist ning tabelite ühendamist.
Töö aluseks on järgmised kolm väidet. Esiteks väidame, et turvalist ühisar-
vutust kasutades on võimalik kavandada ja realiseerida enimkasutatud statistilise
analüüsi algoritmid ilma eelnevalt teadmata, millistes uuringutes neid kasutama
hakatakse. Teiseks väidame, et need algoritmid on võimalik kokku panna statis-
tiliseks tööriistaks, mis sarnaneb olemasolevatele statistilistele pakettidele olles
seega arusaadav analüütiku jaoks ning eeldades, et analüütik ei pea tingimata ük-
sikasjalikult tundma allolevaid krüptograafilisi protokolle. Kolmandaks väidame,
et need algoritmid on piisavalt kiired, et neid on võimalik kasutada isegi suurema-
hulistes uuringutes.
Töö koosneb kuuest peatükist. Esimene peatükk on sissejuhatav, kirjeldab
probleemistikku, mille jaoks me lahendusi otsime ning räägib töö üldisest struk-
tuurist. Teine peatükk võtab kokku teoreetilise tausta, millele me oma töös tugi-
neme.
Kolmandas peatükis vaatleme üht statistilise uuringu näidisrakendust, mis te-
geleb privaatsust säilitavate ülegenoomsete assotsiatsiooniuuringutega. Peatüki
juurde kuuluvas artiklis [48] kirjeldame, kuidas kavandasime ja implementeeri-
sime neli neis uuringutes tihemini vajaminevat statistilist testi kasutades süstee-
mis SHAREMIND olemasolevat täisarvuaritmeetikat. Selle töö käigus jõuame jä-
reldusele, et keerukamate statistiliste funktsioonide tarbeks on meil vaja privaat-
sust säilitavat ujukomaaritmeetikat. Samas näitame, et privaatsust säilitav statisti-
line analüüs on mõistlikus ajas teostatav ka andmebaaside peal, kus on miljoneid
kirjeid.
Neljandas peatükis kirjeldame, kuidas me jätkame oma tööd kavandades ja
implementeerides ujukomaarvud, nende liitmise, korrutamise ning võrdlemise raa-
mistikul SHAREMIND [49]. Lisaks kavandame ja implementeerime privaatsust
säilitavad elementaarfunktsioonid, mis arvutavad pöördarvu, ruutjuurt, siinust, na-
turaallogaritmi, e astmeid ning veafunktsiooni erf. Loodud aritmeetika ja funkt-
sioonide testimiseks implementeerime algoritmi, mis arvutab satelliitide kokku-
põrketõenäosust.
Loodud aritmeetikat kasutades saame luua ja implemeneteerida enimkasu-
tatud statistilise analüüsi meetodid privaatsust säilitava keskkonna jaoks [8, 9].
Viiendas peatükis kirjeldamegi, kuidas ühendame loodud funktsionaalsuse töö-
riistaks RMIND, mis meenutab statistilise analüüsi keskkonda R. See tööriist on
mõeldud statistikutele, et aidata neil läbi viia privaatsust säilitavaid uuringuid il-
ma, et nad peaksid detailselt aru saama allolevast krüptograafiast. Loodud funkt-
sionaalsuse hulgas on kirjeldava statistika meetodid (näiteks viie väärtusega kok-
kuvõte ja histogrammid), lihtsad statistilised mõõdikud (näiteks kesmine ja stan-
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dardhälve), statistilised testid (näiteks t-test ja χ2 test) ning lineaarregressioon.
Dissertatsiooni lõpetuseks kirjeldame kuuendas peatükis, kuidas me valmis-
tame ette tööriista RMIND, et viia läbi suuremahulist privaatsust-säilitavat statisti-
list uuringut tegelike andmete peal. Me kirjeldame probleeme, mis tekivad sellise
uuringu praktilise läbiviimisega turvalise ühisarvutuse keskkonnas. Arutleme te-
gelike andmetega töötamisega seotud ohtude ning puudujääkide üle, toome ära
privaatsust säilitava andmete teisendamise protsessi detailid ning kirjeldame, kui-
das tööriista RMIND antud uuringus kasutama hakatakse.
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